

***Research on the effectiveness of Police
practice in reducing residential burglary
Report 10***

**Overview: Research on the
Effectiveness of Police Practice in
Reducing Residential Burglary**

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December 2005



Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary

- Report 1: *Surveys of Household Burglary part one (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 2: *Surveys of Household Burglary part two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 3: *Literature review: Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Dr Sally Harvey, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 4: *Case study of the Manurewa Police Area*, Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 5: *Case study of the Rotorua Police Area*, Tanya Segessenmann and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 6: *Case study of the Lower Hutt Police Area*, Alison Chetwin and Helena Barwick, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 7: *Case study of the Sydenham Police Area*, Dr Sue Carswell and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 8: *Victims of burglary*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 9: *Burglary offenders*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
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Foreword

Burglary is a problem that considerably affects many New Zealand households. From victimisation surveys we know that it can have a profound effect on victims and that householders are concerned about it. Burglary is also costly both to government and to the New Zealand public. Reducing burglary is a key priority in government's Crime Reduction Strategy and an important outcome for the justice sector.

Although recorded burglary rates show a declining trend since the late 1990s, there is considerable room to achieve further reductions. The extensive research published here helps us understand what strategies might be effective in which contexts, as well as the reasons why they are effective. The research has revealed a wealth of practical and workable strategies and initiatives that can be shared from one Police Area to another.

The research project is the result of a highly productive collaboration between the Ministry of Justice and New Zealand Police. We are grateful for the substantial funding support for the project provided by the Cross Departmental Research Pool (CDRP) administered by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology. In the spirit of the CDRP, it has been an excellent example of cross-departmental research on a subject of high priority to government.

The real commitment of the New Zealand Police to reducing crime is evident throughout the ten reports of the Burglary Reduction Research Programme. This substantial series of reports is published to be used in part or in its entirety by front-line Police, as well as managers, advisers and policy makers, all of whom play a variety of roles in the wider justice sector in the effort to reduce burglary.

Belinda Clark
Secretary for Justice

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Abbreviations

Comms	Communications Centres
CPTED	Crime prevention through environmental design
CSE	Crime Scene Examiners
DP	Directed patrolling
DPR	Directed patrolling report
ER	Emergency response
Hutt Crim	Lower Hutt Crime and Crash Reduction Intelligence Model
Intel	Intel Unit: a group of staff who process information and provide intelligence within an Area or District
LES	Law Enforcement System
LET	Law Enforcement Team
MAP	Map-based Analytical Policing System
MO	Modus operandii
MRA	Market Reduction Approach
NIA;	National Intelligence Application
NS	Neighbourhood Support
NZNSCV	New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims
OCR	Operation and Crime Review
SBD	Secured by design
SNAP	Serial Number Action Project
SOCO	Scene of Crime Officers
VS	Victim Support

Executive summary

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted a programme of research from 2002 to 2004 on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. Residential burglary is one of the most common crimes dealt with by Police, is of concern to New Zealand householders, and is regarded as a major problem by police forces internationally. The research aimed to understand which practices are effective in which contexts and why.

The research studied four Police Areas: Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt, and Sydenham (Canterbury). Information was gathered from: Police recorded offence data; the Ministry of Justice criminal history data; interviews with local Police, other justice sector agencies, community organisations and second-hand dealers; interviews with offenders (28); interviews with victims (54); household surveys (500 households in each Police Area in 2002 and 2004); and the international literature.

This overview report brings together the detailed findings of the research, which have been published in ten research reports. These include reports on the case studies of the four Police Areas, the household surveys (two reports), interviews with victims, interviews with offenders, a literature review, and this overview.

Burglary reduction has been a key strategic goal for Government and Police nationally. The four Police Areas have translated this goal into a range of approaches to reducing burglary, known as situational crime prevention. This involves analysing crime problems with a view to reducing opportunities for offending through offender-focused, victim-focused, property-focused, or location-focused interventions.

Offender-focused interventions

Offender-focused interventions observed in each of the Police Areas studied included:

- seeking and actively policing bail conditions for apprehended offenders
- ‘targeting’ highly recidivist offenders
- seeking custody clearances
- collecting DNA samples and fingerprints
- following established preventive practices with youth offenders.

The research found that the conviction rates of offenders targeted in each area generally increased in the year of targeting, suggesting that the intervention resulted in an increased risk of apprehension and prosecution leading to the incapacitation of those sentenced to imprisonment. An analysis of the court location of burglary convictions in the years prior to, during and following targeting found that there appeared to be little displacement.

Interviews with burglary offenders found that some were aware of Police targeting, while more were aware of Police efforts to conduct bail checks and collect DNA samples and fingerprints. Most were confident that they could evade Police initiatives, although those who had experienced bail checks were evenly divided over whether this practice had deterred them from committing offences. Offenders were particularly positive about the value of programmes they had completed as part of their sentences.

These findings are in line with overseas studies, which conclude that sentences are more effective in changing offender motivation when they include a programme designed to address the causes of offending. The international research also endorses targeting repeat offenders as an effective policing strategy.

Victim-focused interventions

Victim-focused interventions in the four Police Areas studied included providing security advice to victims and fostering partnerships with Neighbourhood Support and Victim Support.

The evidence showed that burglary reduction strategies could be enhanced by an increased focus on victims, particularly repeat victims. A majority of the offenders interviewed said they would return to the same house or area to commit burglary. The household surveys confirmed that, in all areas, a small number of repeat victims accounted for a substantial proportion of all victimisations. Repeat victims were likely to rent their home, or to be sole-parent families, beneficiaries, students or Maori. Focusing burglary reduction interventions on repeat victims concentrates resources on those at highest risk.

Victims who reported their burglaries to Police were asked how satisfied they were with the Police response. The service received and the attitude of Police contributed more to their satisfaction than whether or not the crime was solved or their property recovered. Burglary victims generally perceived that Police were under-resourced to deal with burglary and would have liked more follow-up information from Police.

Over the research period, there was some reduction in the proportion of people who thought crime was a problem, but no evidence that householders were taking greater care to secure properties or join Neighbourhood Support, or were more willing to report suspicious behaviour or burglary to Police. The household surveys and other sources of information for this research provide strong evidence that encouraging victims and the public to take simple security actions, such as locking, lighting and liaising with neighbours, is likely to reduce risk of burglary.

Property-focused interventions

Internationally, market reduction strategies use intelligence gathering and analysis to map property markets to disrupt the chains of supply and demand for stolen goods. All of the Police Areas studied liaised with second-hand dealers and encouraged property marking and recording from time to time, but this effort had not always been consistent. While international research is inconclusive about the effectiveness of property marking in reducing

burglary, the household surveys indicate a modest uptake of this practice in the four Police Areas.

Most burglary offenders interviewed said they sold goods to 'unspecified contacts' and a small proportion had sold to drug dealers, to friends, or to second-hand shops, although some offenders thought it was risky to use second-hand dealers as an outlet for stolen goods. A few second-hand dealers said they had passed information to the Police resulting in the apprehension of offenders.

Overall the evidence suggests that liaison with second-hand dealers and the mapping of property markets are worthwhile components of comprehensive burglary reduction strategies.

Location-focused interventions

Location-focused interventions are aimed at increasing the guardianship of vulnerable areas through Police presence, voluntary community patrols, or environmental changes.

All four Police Areas had incorporated directed patrolling into standard operational practice during the period of study. 'Whole-of-policing' approaches to directed patrolling were tried when resources were available. The role of intelligence was central, both in providing information to direct operations and in recording and analysing intelligence gathered in the course of directed patrolling operations.

Almost half of burglary offenders interviewed were aware of increased Police patrolling and a few were aware of community patrols. There was some evidence that the presence of Police was a deterrent, although many said that they could evade Police patrolling. Householders surveyed were also likely to be aware of Police patrolling and said they would feel safer from burglary if Police were more visible. However, key informants said that some disadvantaged communities felt targeted by a heightened Police presence. Overall the international research endorses directed patrolling as an effective approach to reducing crime.

Burglary response and investigation

Burglary is an offence with a low resolution rate and only a small proportion of resolutions are the result of Police investigation. Nevertheless, investigation leading to the apprehension and prosecution of offenders can have a marked impact on burglary incidence rates, because the bulk of burglary offences are committed by a few recidivist offenders.

Research has shown that rapid responses to in-progress burglaries are most successful in apprehending burglars. Police staff in all Areas expressed some frustration with delays in receiving priority one calls and with the quality of information received from the Policing Communications Centres.

The initial Police response is known to be a significant factor in the success of an investigation. During the research period most of the Areas studied had from time to time deployed dedicated single-staffed cars, which had improved the quality of initial investigations, but this dedicated resource could not always be sustained.

International research shows that better results are achieved if forensics staff are integrated into the whole investigative process as expert collaborators rather than operating as independent technical assistants. The Police Areas studied varied in the extent to which forensics staff were integrated in this way.

Police organisation and the use of intelligence

Although opinion is divided over the value of deploying staff in specialised squads, many of the initiatives believed to have reduced the burglary rate employed special squads focused on burglary. Examples were the Law Enforcement Teams which were eventually deployed at area level in Manurewa and Rotorua, the Tactical Response Group in Lower Hutt and the Break Squad in Sydenham.

Effective crime reduction strategies require a capacity for intelligence and crime analysis. 'Intelligence' refers to a structure, a process and a product. Using intelligence well requires organisational structures that bring decision-makers together to consider and use intelligence products to formulate and implement crime reduction strategies. In all of the Areas studied, the intelligence function developed and increased in use throughout the research period and a number of elements of observed good practice have been documented.

Conclusions

A major conclusion from the research findings is that the development of comprehensive, multicomponent local strategies for burglary reduction was as important for effectiveness as the implementation of specific interventions. Some important elements of local strategic direction, which it was clear was informed by international best practice, were:

- whole-of-policing approaches to burglary reduction
- the central role of the intelligence function in providing information, direction and coordination of the burglary reduction effort
- effective leadership of the crime reduction strategy at Area level
- the adoption of proactive and problem-solving approaches
- 'hot' offender-, victim-, property- and location-focused interventions
- good communication through the weekly whole-of-Area meeting, directed daily briefing for each section, and training and supervision on key requirements
- lifting performance in routine procedures such as taking offence reports and processing files
- processes to monitor compliance with proactive work and appraise the performance of individuals and units.

The configuration and reconfiguration of local strategies over the research period was a search for reorganisation which would produce a sustained reduction in priority crimes. This reduction needed to be achieved without any substantial increase in resourcing and without a displacement of offending to areas receiving less attention, such as theft from cars.

Some saw this sustained reduction as achievable through implementing problem-solving and whole-of-policing approaches, rather than dedicating resources to burglary reduction. These types of approaches require Area and District Commanders to have the discretion to deploy resources flexibly. The trend observed over the three-year research period suggests that strategic approaches and any new resourcing would most effectively be focused at Police Area level, unless, as in the Canterbury District, unique contextual factors indicate otherwise.

The researchers heard from all Areas of the difficulties in sustaining burglary reduction efforts which were added to existing local policing requirements without additional resourcing. The effect of the varying intensity of the burglary effort can be seen in the time-series analysis of recorded residential burglary rates for each area. The periods of reduced intensity of the overall effort were periods of increased recorded residential burglary rates and periods of greater intensity were periods of reduced recorded residential burglary rates.

In considering the effectiveness of Police practice, a range of contextual factors operate alongside Police practice and impact on desired outcomes. The Police Areas with the highest incidence of burglary in this research were those with the highest levels of socio-economic deprivation and the highest concentration of youthful populations.

There are many possible contributors to the trends in the incidence of burglary and it has not been possible in this research to directly attribute changes in burglary rates to particular Police practices. Many factors, as well as new and improved Police strategies, are likely to have contributed to the decline in rates of recorded residential burglary across New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Over the same period the rates of recorded residential burglary fell by a substantially larger percentage in three of the Areas studied, and increased in one of the Areas.

The research findings suggest that the way forward involves:

- a mix of comprehensive, multicomponent, problem-solving approaches
- enhanced partnerships with the justice sector, local government and community organisations
- greater integration of the work with youth offenders into crime reduction strategies
- enhanced victim-focused approaches.

1 Introduction

This report presents an overview of the findings of a three-year research programme on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. The Ministry of Justice conducted the research, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, from 2002 to 2004. This overview draws on nine separate reports, including:

- a review of the international literature
- case studies of four Police Areas
- interviews with burglary victims and burglary offenders
- household surveys carried out in four Police Areas in 2002 and 2004.

It begins by describing the background to the research, outlines the research design, and then discusses the importance of context. Offender-focused, victim-focused, location-focused and property-focused interventions, and aspects of Police organisation, are then examined in turn, along with the evidence for effectiveness and the elements of good practice observed during the course of the research¹. Following a section on barriers to effective practice, a concluding section examines what we have learnt and possible future directions.

1.1 Background

1.1.1 The extent of the problem

Residential burglary:

- is one of the most common crimes dealt with by Police
- is of great concern to the general public as reflected in crime victim surveys
- is regarded as a major problem by police forces studied in international literature.

In New Zealand in 2004 burglary represented 14% of all recorded offences, and two-thirds of these were residential burglaries. Nationally, this was a rate of 90 burglaries per 10,000 population, but there was considerable variation in the residential burglary rate across different Police Districts, ranging from 34 per 10,000 population in Tasman to 120 per 10,000 in Counties-Manukau (New Zealand Police 2005).

¹ The elements of good practice are included as practices that have worked in specific contexts at some times, and are not intended to be prescriptive.

Some households are more vulnerable to burglary than others and may be subject to repeat burglary victimisation. The New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims (NZNSCV) 2001 estimates that 6% of households were burgled in 2000, while 1% of households were burgled more than once, representing 37% of all burglaries (Morris et al. 2003).

Crime victims' surveys show that the fear of being burgled ranks high amongst people's concerns, and many think that burglary is a specific problem in their area. Almost three quarters of respondents in the NZNSCV 2001 who felt their neighbourhood had a crime problem identified burglary as their most serious crime concern (Morris et al. 2003). Burglary is also considered a highly intrusive crime. The NZNSCV 2001 shows that victims of burglary are as much affected as or more affected than are victims of assaults or threats.

The risk of becoming a victim of burglary varies considerably, not only by area but also by household characteristics. The NZNSCV 2001 reveals a pattern of household risk. In an analysis of the 6% of households burgled in the previous year, those living with flatmates, those living with extended family and solo parents were more likely to be burgled than other groups (e.g. couples with children and those living on their own). Students and those living on benefits were burgled more frequently than other income groups. Owner-occupied residences were at less risk of burglary than those living in rental accommodation; and those renting privately or from Housing New Zealand were at greater risk than those renting from local authority councils. Pacific peoples seemed to be most at risk of all ethnic groups (Morris et al. 2003).

Who burgles and why are reported less confidently. This caution results partly from the concern that, with only up to one-fifth of reported burglaries solved, burglars identified in criminal justice system records may be atypical. In a study of the criminal careers of New Zealand burglars, an estimated 5% of the population cohort studied had a burglary conviction:

- 44% of the burglary offender group had one conviction
- 46% had 2–10 burglary convictions
- 9% were prolific burglary offenders with more than 10 convictions (Triggs 2000).

The peak age for burglary convictions was 15. Prolific offenders were more likely to:

- be male and of Maori ethnicity
- start their offending younger and have longer criminal careers
- have higher rates of offending (number of charges per year)
- have more convictions for offences other than burglary.

While persistent burglary offenders had convictions for other offences, these tended to be for other property offences such as theft, vehicle conversion and receiving stolen goods. However, over two-thirds of this group had at least one conviction for an offence against the person (mainly violent offences).

Burglary in New Zealand results in a high cost to householders, business and government. For example, residential burglaries in New Zealand result in approximately \$100 million a year in insurance claims (McLoughlin 1999).

Burglary has low resolution rates compared with other offences. In 2004, 17% of recorded burglaries were resolved² (New Zealand Police 2005). The only other recorded crimes with lower resolution rates were bicycle offences and theft from cars.

1.1.2 Criminal justice system responses to burglary

The criminal justice system response to burglary spans the work of several agencies. It includes:

- the services of New Zealand Police
- Court services
- the New Zealand Public Prisons Service
- the Community Probation Service
- contracts with community organisations such as Safer Community Councils, Victim Support Services, and the providers of rehabilitation programmes
- the development of legislation and policy within the Ministry of Justice.

While the services of the Police are central to the prevention, investigation and resolution of burglary, effective responses to burglary would ideally involve all of these agencies acting in coordination.

In 1999 the government made a commitment to address burglary and youth crime as priority concerns. The focus on burglary, reaffirmed in the Crime Reduction Strategy, resulted in the allocation of additional funding and the implementation of legislative changes to target burglary issues. Over \$13 million in additional funding was awarded to the Police to be spent over 2000–2003 on reducing burglary, particularly repeat burglary.

In June 2000, the Justice and Police Ministers announced a new major burglary strategy, including the introduction of tougher laws for burglars and stolen goods traders. This included amendments to the Bail Act in 2000 making it harder for repeat burglars to obtain bail. The Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act, allowing Police to take DNA samples from burglary suspects, came into effect in April 2004. A new Second-hand Dealers' and Pawnbrokers Act, intended to make it more difficult for stolen items to be sold, came into effect in April 2005.

In 2001, the Ministry of Justice, the New Zealand Police and the New Zealand Council of Victim Support Services piloted a 'target hardening' programme in which repeat burglary victims with low incomes were offered security equipment and advice. The separate evaluation of this pilot will be discussed in Section 5.2 of this overview.

² An offence is considered to be resolved when the police have identified and either warned, cautioned, or prosecuted an offender.

1.1.3 The need for evaluation

The evaluation of Police practice in reducing burglary is needed to refine our understanding of good practice for preventing and reducing burglary in the New Zealand context, and to inform government's policy development and law reform in this area. Because Police services are central to burglary outcomes, and the subject of major government investment, the research has focused on Police practice in this area. The report of the Controller and Auditor-General (New Zealand Auditor-General 2001) stated, 'The Police need to understand better the relationship between policing practices and desired policy outcomes. Evaluations of "what works" should be considered for activities assessed as having the most potential to lead to improved outcomes.' This report also identified the need for dissemination of information on good practice. The research which is the subject of this overview was designed to go some way toward meeting this need in relation to reducing burglary.

1.2 Research design and methodology

1.2.1 Research objectives

The Research on the Effectiveness of Police Practice in Reducing Burglary aimed to:

- examine Police practice, including Police initiatives in partnership with communities, in relation to residential burglary reduction; to understand which practices are effective in which contexts and why
- gain an understanding of some wider contextual factors which influence the effectiveness of burglary initiatives
- examine effectiveness in relation to the incidence of burglary, the resolution of burglary, public satisfaction, public perceptions of safety
- examine any unintended effects of burglary initiatives, such as displacement.

1.2.2 Research design

In any community a range of initiatives are likely to be in place for the purpose of addressing and preventing burglary. Initiatives range from specific Police interventions, such as targeting offenders, to interventions delivered to victims, such as advice on securing the home, through to interventions with a more general focus, such as programmes for young people at risk. None of these initiatives occurs in isolation, and consequently an evaluation design needs to recognise that there are multiple interlinked contributors to particular outcomes.

In this research, four Police Areas are the units of study. Within each of these areas, all of the Police initiatives which impact on burglary as well as community-specific contextual factors were examined in relation to burglary outcomes. General crime prevention initiatives which are indirectly related to burglary, such as youth employment programmes or truancy reduction schemes, were recognised as part of the context in which the Police initiatives operate.

In this overview the interventions directly related to Police practice and burglary have been linked to specific outcomes by examining the mechanisms by which they might be expected

to achieve those outcomes. Identifying the underlying mechanism resolves the question of how and why a particular initiative might achieve a particular outcome. For example, targeting known offenders might be expected to lead to a reduction in repeat offending through the mechanisms of incapacitation and deterrence. The evaluation design includes measures such as reconviction rates and the self-report of targeted offenders to verify the extent to which such mechanisms are operating.

Initiatives have been further linked to outcomes by employing time-series analysis of specific outcome measures, such as recorded burglary. Because there is no Police Area in which burglary interventions are absent, it has not been possible to employ a design which incorporates control or comparison areas. Time-series designs employing a range of measures and methods (triangulation³) and the identification of the mechanisms which link intervention with outcome can together be expected to lead to findings in which we can have confidence. This type of design is known as realistic evaluation, and was developed by researchers working on various crime prevention evaluations sponsored by the British Home Office in the 1990s (Pawson and Tilley 1997).

1.2.3 Scope of the research

The evaluation has focused on interventions delivered by Police, including those carried out in partnership with their communities, to reduce residential burglary. Particular emphasis was given to the following types of interventions within selected Police Areas:

- ‘hot’ offenders: initiatives which target known burglars
- ‘hot’ victims: initiatives which aim to increase the security of victims
- ‘hot’ locations: initiatives which involve targeted patrolling of locations with high burglary concentrations
- ‘hot’ property: initiatives which aim to reduce the market for burgled goods.

The case studies consider such contextual factors as:

- the demographic make-up of communities studied
- the geographic features of the community
- other community initiatives
- other local criminal justice sector services
- environmental factors.

³ If diverse kinds of data lead to the same conclusions, then more confidence can be placed in the validity and reliability of those conclusions.

The areas studied were selected in consultation with Police. We aimed to select areas with a broad coverage of features which may impact on burglary. Because areas which are predominantly rural have their own unique crime problems and generally have low burglary rates, these areas were omitted from the selection frame. The studied areas were selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- a range of burglary rates
- provincial/urban location
- the operation of specific Police structures such as Law Enforcement Teams (LETs)
- plans or willingness to implement new initiatives
- representation across Police districts
- demographic and geographic spread.

The areas selected were:

- Manurewa (in the Counties-Manukau Police District)
- Rotorua (in the Bay of Plenty Police District)
- Lower Hutt (in the Wellington Police District)
- Sydenham⁴ (in the Canterbury Police District).

1.2.4 Summary of information sources

The information was gathered from the following sources in each area:

- Police recorded data: crime rates, burglary rates, resolution rates
- Criminal Histories Database (Ministry of Justice): criminal histories of offenders
- key informant interviews: local Police, Community Probation Service, programme providers, Youth Justice Coordinators, Victim Support workers, neighbourhood watch coordinators, volunteers, second-hand dealers (2002–2004)
- interviews with local offenders (28 in total)
- interviews with local victims (54 in total)
- household surveys in each area (500 households in each area in 2002 and 2004)
- international literature on the effectiveness of police practice in reducing burglary.

The Ministry convened an advisory group, consisting of representatives of key stakeholder agencies and representatives from each of the Police Areas selected for study, to provide advice on the design, conduct and management of the project. The study has been resourced by the Ministry of Justice and the Cross Departmental Research Pool, a fund administered by

⁴ In 2004 Sydenham was incorporated into the new Canterbury Southern Police Area.

the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology to support cross-departmental research of high priority to government.

1.2.5 Reports

This overview draws on several reports which have been produced for this research. These are:

- Case study reports 2002–2004—Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt, and Sydenham Police Areas (Johns 2005; Segessenmann and Johns 2005; Chetwin and Barwick 2005; Carswell and Johns 2005)
- Interviews with burglary victims in four Police Areas (Baker and Gray 2005b)
- Interviews with burglary offenders in four Police Areas (Baker and Gray 2005a)
- Household surveys on burglary victimisation, crime prevention and crime perceptions in 2002 and 2004 in four Police Areas (Triggs 2005a, 2005b)
- Review of the international literature on the effectiveness of police practice in reducing residential burglary (Harvey 2005).

2 The importance of context

The importance of the context in which Police operate cannot be underestimated. In considering the effectiveness of Police practice, it is important to understand the factors which operate alongside Police practice that may be impacting on desired outcomes. In the case of burglary rates, the socio-economic make-up of a community and social capital within a community are highly likely to impact on the level of crime and on efforts to reduce crime.

For example, Martin (2002) tested the significance of a range of socio-economic variables as predictors of the residential burglary rate in Detroit neighbourhoods. It was found that the age composition of an area was the primary determinant, but factors that indicated concentrated poverty and a lack of social capital were also significant. The strong positive correlation between the percentage of the population under 18 and the burglary rate suggests that residential burglary is in large part a youth problem.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Police Areas with the highest incidence of burglary in this research are those with the highest levels of socio-economic deprivation and the highest proportions of youthful populations.

Manurewa had the highest prevalence rate for burglary and the highest levels of concern about burglary of the four areas studied. The household survey found that 11% of Manurewa households had been victims of burglary in 2001, and 62% of survey participants believed crime, and especially burglary, was a problem in their neighbourhood. Manurewa has a higher youth population (aged under 17), a higher reliance on benefit income, and a higher proportion of sole parent families, compared with national averages⁵. More than one-third of its population is at the highest levels of deprivation⁶. There were a number of community initiatives attempting to address the implications of these factors, such as truancy programmes, alternative education programmes, sports and community renewal programmes. The Counties-Manukau Police had a partnership with the Manukau City Council which led the development of a Crime Prevention Action Plan in 2003. Nevertheless, Manurewa Police and community participants in this research believed there was insufficient government and community response to the problems of the community.

In Rotorua, the household survey found that 9% of households had been victims of burglary in 2001, and 53% of participants believed that crime, and especially burglary, was a problem in their neighbourhood. Almost one-third of the population are under 17 years; there is a high level of deprivation on average, a higher proportion of the adult population with no qualifications and a high proportion of sole parent families. Various initiatives, such as efforts

⁵ Statistics New Zealand Census 2001.

⁶ Levels 9 and 10 on New Zealand Deprivation Index.

to reduce truancy and community renewal, were in place in Rotorua. Police had strong partnerships with a Maori Advisory Group and Mana Social Services, which offered restorative justice services and youth diversion programmes.

By contrast, in Lower Hutt, the household survey found that 7% of households were victims of burglary in 2001 and that 41% of participants believed that crime, especially burglary, was a problem in their neighbourhood. Lower Hutt's population had an age structure and educational and employment levels similar to the average for New Zealand. Factors which community and Police interviewed for this research believed increased the risk of burglary in Lower Hutt were:

- its proximity to a large prison
- pockets of state housing with particularly deprived households
- a growing drugs problem
- evidence of truancy.

The local Police had a partnership with the Safer Community Action Network, sponsored by the Lower Hutt City Council.

In Sydenham, the household survey found that 7% of households were the victims of burglary in 2001 and that 43% of participants believed that crime, especially burglary, was a problem in their neighbourhood, reflecting lower levels of risk of burglary and worry about burglary. The population of Sydenham had a slightly lower proportion in the younger age groups and a slightly higher proportion in the 60-plus age group. While the incomes were slightly lower on average than those for New Zealand, the population had lower unemployment and higher qualifications than the national average. The Sydenham Police Area was situated in the urban mass of Christchurch, meaning the area boundaries were somewhat artificial. The Police who took part in this research pointed out that the flat topography allowed for a high mobility of offenders across the urban area. Sydenham Police Area was amalgamated with Hornby and Selby in 2003 to form the Canterbury Southern Area.

3 Strategic direction for reducing burglary

Since the allocation of \$13 million in additional funding for reducing burglary in 2000–2003, burglary reduction remains a key strategic goal for Government and Police nationally. Government policing priorities were translated into Police objectives through the New Zealand Police strategic plan to 2006, the Departmental Forecast Report, and, from 2002 to 2003, the Statement of Intent. These documents reflect the priorities of the Crime Reduction Strategy, which aligns Police goals with the goals of other partner agencies, and have consistently identified residential burglary as a key priority.

The national priorities are communicated to the District Commanders through these documents and also by means of the Police Executive Conference. At district level, the priorities of the Statement of Intent are carried through each year into the District Business Plans, the agreement with Government on what the district will deliver. District Commanders have considerable flexibility and discretion in developing local strategies. They are held accountable by means of an annual district appraisal based on specific performance measures, in the form of population-based recorded district crime rates and resolution rates.

The Policing Development Group in the Office of the Commissioner provides information and support for the development of district strategies. In 2002 they produced the National dwelling burglary reduction strategy, which provided districts and areas with a framework for the development of local strategies. The strategy advocated intelligence (Intel)-led policing to identify burglary problems and develop appropriate responses, encouraging a focus on repeat offenders, victims and locations, and the disruption of stolen property markets. This undoubtedly drew on the UK Home Office work on effective policing strategies for reducing offending (Jordan 1998), which concluded that police have made a significant impact on crime where they have adopted locally relevant tactics within a strategic framework tailored to the problem being addressed and to local conditions. This required:

- local crime audits
- good Intel systems
- proper strategic management
- monitoring of performance
- the ability to respond creatively to a constantly changing crime picture.

3.1 Approaches to reducing burglary

The particular approaches to reducing burglary adopted by the four areas in our study have been informed by established theories of offending. *Routine activity theory* (Cohen and Felson 1979—cited in Hough and Tilley 1998) suggests that three elements must come together for an offence to occur—a suitable target, a likely or motivated offender, and the absence of a suitable guardian either protecting the target or discouraging the offender. Burglars check for suitable targets with an absence of suitable guardians by assessing cues in terms of accessibility, surveillability, and occupancy. *Rational choice theory* (Cornish and Clarke 1986—cited in Hough and Tilley 1998) assumes that offending is purposive behaviour designed to benefit the offender based on the assessment of risks and benefits.

These theories have led to the development of approaches known as *situational crime prevention*. This involves analysing crime problems with a view to reducing opportunities for offending by:

- making it harder to offend (making targets less accessible)
- increasing the risks of offending (increasing surveillance and the likelihood of being apprehended)
- decreasing the rewards (making property more difficult to sell)
- removing the motivation for offending (offender treatment).

In the context of the areas studied for this research, these approaches have been grouped into a series of interventions which can broadly be categorised as offender-, victim-, location- and property-focused interventions. The sections which follow examine the application of these types of interventions in the different contexts represented in the four case studies, examine the evidence for effectiveness of particular interventions, and discuss the elements of good practice related to each intervention observed by the researchers over the study period, 2002–2004.

Each intervention is best viewed as one possible ‘tool’ to be incorporated into a broader, multicomponent strategy. Much of the international research evidence for the effectiveness of specific interventions has arisen from evaluations of multicomponent strategies for burglary reduction. As found in the present study, it is often not possible to isolate the impact of each separate intervention. Since there are many contributors to the actual incidence of burglary in any Police Area (and the true incidence is very difficult to measure), the discussion of effectiveness will examine whether the mechanisms by which each intervention is expected to operate were in fact operating through their intermediate outcomes—the *realistic evaluation* approach.

4 Offender-focused interventions

There are a range of possible interventions to prevent motivated offenders from reaching suitable targets. These include actions making it harder to offend and increasing the risks for offenders, for example through the more traditional policing approaches of enforcement and incapacitation, as well as increasing the likelihood of detection. There are also a number of programmes aimed at decreasing the motivation to offend, in the groups of both those who are already offending and those who are at risk of becoming offenders.

4.1 What we found

Because Police were aware that a significant number of burglaries were committed by known offenders while on bail, the seeking of bail conditions, particularly nighttime curfews, at court and the active policing of those conditions was a key aspect of policing in all four areas throughout the research period. The intensity of this effort varied in all areas according to the demands of reactive policing. Seeking remand in custody was also more common following the Bail Act 2000. Bail checks were believed to deter bailed offenders from committing crimes through surveillance.

In all areas highly recidivist offenders were identified and targeted by:

- stopping and questioning
- executing search warrants
- activating arrest warrants
- randomly carrying out visits
- stopping cars
- providing notings of all interactions.

In Manurewa there was 'Operation Card'; in Rotorua 'Fifty-two Pick up'; and in Canterbury Police District the 'First Fifteen' initiative, in addition to the routine targeting in each area. Lower Hutt held one- to three-monthly 'proactive weeks' in which temporary teams from a range of sections worked intensively for three days on an aspect of burglary reduction, often with an offender focus, such as executing search warrants or visiting recent prison releasees. These were difficult to sustain throughout the period and were discontinued when staff numbers were short in 2003. Offender targeting was believed to increase the likelihood of apprehension through increasing the opportunities for detection and through increased surveillance. Apprehension leading to conviction and sentencing was believed to have both incapacitative and rehabilitative effects.

In all areas custody clearances were sought by interviewing suspects and arrested or imprisoned offenders to obtain confessions to any additional burglary offences committed by the offender. Custody clearances were thought to increase resolution rates, to eliminate burglaries from investigations, and to inform victims of the resolution of their burglary. Custody clearances were also believed to increase the likelihood of future apprehension by building information on an offender's modus operandi (MO).

The effectiveness of forensic methods of detection depends on the existence of large national databases of individual DNA samples (DNA Databank) and fingerprints (Automated Fingerprint Identification System). In all areas efforts were made to collect voluntary DNA samples from adult offenders and fingerprints from youth. This was hampered at times by funding restrictions, but the new legislation in force in 2004 reduced the cost by introducing buccal samples, and extended the circumstances in which DNA could be obtained compulsorily from burglary suspects. The collection of DNA samples was believed to both increase the likelihood of detection and act as a deterrent.

In relation to interventions with youth offenders, in all areas the Youth Aid sections had established preventive practices. The majority of young offenders were dealt with through warnings and informal diversion programmes and these approaches were found to be successful with most young offenders. Police also ran their own Youth at Risk programmes. The more serious and recidivist youth offenders were dealt with through the formal youth justice system, involving Family Group Conferences and the Youth Court.

In 2003 Lower Hutt introduced a Youth Services Strategy to improve and coordinate the way Police dealt with young people at high risk of recidivist offending, including burglary. A Youth and Community Services coordinator was appointed and the strategy aimed to:

- ensure work with young offenders was based on best practice
- align the work of those who dealt with young people
- educate officers throughout the Police Area on working effectively with young offenders.

A rostered youth worker was available to work with frontline staff and to follow up on arrested young people.

Canterbury District set up a Youth Crime Unit to coordinate the work with recidivist youth offenders through bail checks and monitoring of course and programme attendance—they were said to take a zero-tolerance approach to offending and breaches of conditions.

The strategies with youth offenders were believed to both deter young offenders and decrease the motivation to offend by directing young people to programmes which would address their criminogenic needs.

4.2 Evidence for the effectiveness of offender-focused interventions

As outlined above, offender-focused interventions were believed to work through several mechanisms. If the mechanisms were working as anticipated, we would expect to find:

- increased apprehensions and convictions for targeted offenders
- a reduction in recorded burglary incidents when bail checks were being applied
- burglars perceiving these practices as a deterrent
- sentenced burglars taking up opportunities to complete rehabilitative programmes.

It is also possible that targeting offenders would produce displacement effects in that targeted offenders might decide to offend in another Police Area where they were unknown. On the other hand it is possible the interventions might result in diffusion of benefit in the sense that apprehensions for offences other than burglary might increase.

The study of conviction rates of offenders targeted in each area shows that their conviction rates generally increased in the year of targeting in most areas. This would suggest that for those offenders the intervention led to an increased risk of apprehension and prosecution and to their incapacitation when sentenced to imprisonment. The increase in conviction rates applied to convictions for both burglary and all offences, suggesting some diffusion of benefit to other offence types.

In the years following targeting, conviction rates for targeted offenders generally declined, in some areas below the rate in the years prior to targeting. One possible explanation is that for those offenders there may have been an incapacitation effect related to a custodial sentence received for their earlier convictions, which reduced their offending. This is in accordance with the study of Operation Anchorage in Canberra by Ratcliffe and Makkai (2004), who suggest that targeting approaches result in a combination of deterrence, discouragement, and incapacitation of prolific offenders.

An examination of the location of convictions in the years prior to, during and following targeting showed that in general there was little displacement. In fact the targeted offenders were shown to have received convictions from a range of District Courts within their wider Police districts before, during and after they were targeted, suggesting that they were a generally mobile group within their local regions.

The interviews with offenders provide further insight into the mechanisms by which offender-focused interventions worked. About half of the 28 burglary offenders interviewed were aware of Police efforts to collect fingerprints, conduct bail checks, and collect DNA samples; about one-third were aware of targeting and executing search warrants. There was little evidence of a deterrent effect from these interventions. Most informants were confident that they could 'get around' Police initiatives. The general perception was that offenders would still seek to meet their need for cash or drugs regardless of what steps Police took.

Most offenders thought increased Police patrolling would be the most effective way to reduce burglaries. This suggests an increased likelihood of being stopped and questioned may have a deterrent effect. Those who had experienced them were divided over whether bail checks had deterred them from committing burglaries—six said they had been deterred and six said they had not.

It is also useful to draw on the international research on these types of interventions for evidence of effectiveness. Targeting repeat offenders is endorsed as an effective policing strategy that works in reviews of international research (Sherman et al. 1997; Jordan 1998). Targeting known offenders has been used in a number of successful burglary reduction initiatives, often as one aspect of multicomponent strategies (Farrell, Chenery and Pease 1998; Ratcliffe 2001; Chilvers and Weatherburn 2001a, 2001b; Home Office 2003c, 2003e).

Chilvers and Weatherburn (2001a, 2001b) urge caution with strategies employing crackdowns. In some social groups, for example the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in Australia, there are suggested links between repeated imprisonment, entrenched unemployment and recidivism. A strategy of targeting repeat offenders may increase or contribute to their long-term unemployment and therefore increase the depth of their involvement in and reliance on crime.

In New South Wales, police resources were particularly focused on ‘hot’ offenders, as well as on ‘hot’ times and places, as a result of the Operation and Crime Review (OCR) panels. These approaches resulted in substantial drops in crime rates, including residential burglaries (Chilvers and Weatherburn 2001a, 2001b). Operation Anchorage in Canberra successfully targeted ‘hot’ offenders and had a deterrent effect (Makkai et al. 2004).

The effectiveness of bail curfews, and of enforcing them, does not appear to have been evaluated in published literature. However, the Rotorua area demonstrated an inverse correlation between number of bail checks and recorded burglaries, so that as the number of bail checks increased, the number of recorded burglaries decreased.

Offender treatment is a strategy to reduce the size of the pool of potential burglary offenders by reducing the likelihood of reoffending. The international literature generally concludes that the effectiveness of a sentence in changing offender motivation appears to be dependent on the effectiveness of any associated intervention programme to reduce reoffending. Offender treatment programmes can reduce the likelihood of future reoffending, and the principles of effective programmes for both young and adult offenders are well-established by research (McLaren 1992).

Offenders interviewed for this research were particularly positive about the value of programmes and services, suggesting that sentencing which includes programmes that address criminogenic needs are worthwhile. Three-quarters of those interviewed said that their sentence had had a positive effect on their behaviour, including all five female offenders. These offenders either saw the certainty of future imprisonment as a deterrent, or they had benefited from programmes or treatment during their sentence. This relatively positive view may be an effect of the sampling in that all were willing participants ready to reflect on their offending. On the other hand, a few offenders said that prison was a way to learn more about crime.

In relation to Police practice with youth offenders, the review of New Zealand and international literature carried out for this project found several important points.

- There are a number of contributory risk factors to youth offending, established through rigorous research. Reference to these can assist in identifying those young people who come to Police attention who may go on to become persistent offenders.
- The way young people are dealt with by Police processing and other criminal justice procedures does have an impact on the likelihood of future offending.
- Arrest of non-prolific youth offenders seems to have little positive impact on reducing reoffending, and can actually increase youth offending. Cautions can be effective deterrents for first offenders.
- Youth conferencing has been shown to have a moderate effect on reducing recidivism.
- Research strongly suggests that all criminal justice processes are more effective at reducing reoffending when combined with appropriate rehabilitative interventions.

Overall, the indications from the current research and from international literature are that the types of offender-focused interventions observed in the four Police Areas can be effective with at least some offenders, particularly when practised within a multicomponent burglary reduction strategy.

4.3 Good practice for offender-focused interventions

Aspects of good practice in implementing offender-focused interventions cover:

- bail checks
- targeting offenders
- clearances
- DNA and fingerprint collection
- youth offenders.

4.3.1 Bail checks

Some examples of good practice involving Intel in organising bail checks include:

- prepare curfew sheets with photo, identity and bail details, and include space for recording checks
- prepare separate lists for separate shifts and different parts of the area
- update lists daily
- produce a matrix which cross-references each prolific offender with their bail conditions and risk factors and update this daily

- record bail conditions, notings and action on breaches carefully and accurately, and update these daily.

Other things that might be done are:

- prepare activity reports on the basis of completed curfew sheets and discuss at training sessions and crime meetings
- design bail conditions for youth offenders to correspond with other efforts to rehabilitate them
- initiate senior police meetings with local judges to discuss Police objectives in seeking bail conditions and prosecuting breaches
- ensure a good transfer of information on breaches at handover of shifts for immediate follow-up
- accompany applications for bail conditions with a report on offender's living arrangements to counter judicial reluctance to disrupt other family members
- use bail checks to get to know offenders and their habits, associates, and patterns of activity
- extend curfews to daytime curfews and non-association orders
- identify those most at risk and bail check them more frequently.

4.3.2 Targeting offenders

Good practice in targeting offenders includes:

- produce profiles of targeted offenders, display and project to all staff at crime meeting
- keep the numbers of targeted offenders at a manageable size and update regularly
- identify suspected active burglary offenders in a fines enforcement list, visit them with a bailiff and arrest them for non-payment
- target suspected active offenders driving non-registered vehicles or driving while disqualified, arrest them, disqualify them from driving and/or impound the vehicle
- use the weekly crime meeting to report progress on bail checks and targeting activity
- keep the targeting period short term to allow for other work
- involve traffic units, Intel, youth and community services, CIB, and general duties staff in targeting work
- monitor bail checks and notings; set target numbers and use this in performance feedback to staff at area, unit and individual level
- allocate individual offenders to individual staff or units
- develop a clear rationale for selection of offenders for targeting

- provide strong back-up from management in the event of complaints about targeting activity
- have sufficient data entry staff to rapidly enter notings into National Information Application (NIA)
- coordinate targeting activities at monthly district-wide meetings in a large metropolitan district
- assign one person to coordinate all strategies and information gathered on one offender
- establish temporary teams from a range of sections to work intensively for a few days on an aspect of offender targeting
- use the Parole Act 2002 and work with Community Probation Service to have parole conditions applied to targeted offenders
- follow an initial police crackdown on known offenders with a consolidation phase involving a range of other burglary reduction initiatives (Home Office 2003c).

4.3.3 Clearances

Good practice in clearances includes:

- Intel preparing files of burglaries with similar MOs and information about suspects' associates for use in custody clearances
- introducing Crime Recorders to assist with paperwork associated with custody clearances
- establishing clear guidelines for the decision not to prosecute custody clearances
- ensuring all resolutions, including those obtained by Youth Aid, are entered into NIA.
- utilising officers with specialized interviewing skills to deal with custody clearances
- interviewing prison inmates sentenced for burglary.

4.3.4 DNA and fingerprint collection

Good practice in DNA and fingerprint collection includes:

- report monthly figures and stress importance of collecting DNA samples at crime meetings
- appoint a senior staff member to coordinate and instruct staff on the complexities of DNA collection
- conduct regular training on DNA technological and legislative changes
- set targets for DNA collection.

4.3.5 Youth offenders

Good practice in dealing with youth offenders includes:

- align youth services staff with burglary reduction strategies, while preserving known good practice with youth offenders
- improve data recording of the volume and nature of offending by young people
- bring Police youth services staff together under common management
- give all Police instruction on using the law with recidivist young offenders to address the factors which contribute to their offending
- build a strong relationship with the Department of Child Youth and Family youth justice staff in working with young offenders.

5 Victim-focused interventions

The interventions which focus on victims of burglary aim to make properties less likely to be selected as suitable targets by increasing perceived guardianship of houses, and by making entry for potential offenders more difficult and more risky. Focusing burglary reduction interventions on 'hot' victims concentrates on those individuals with an elevated risk of future burglary and presents a way of focusing resources. It is a strategy that brings together victim support and crime prevention (Pease 1998).

Research has shown that:

- victimisation is the best single predictor of further victimisation
- when revictimisation recurs it tends to do so quickly
- high crime rates and 'hot' spots are as they are primarily because of rates of repeat victimisation (Pease 1998).

The prevention of repeat victimisation has been a focus for burglary reduction strategies internationally. The household surveys carried out for this project showed that, in the four Police Areas, 15–34% of victims were repeat victims in 2003 and these accounted for 32–68% of all victimisations in that year. Repeat victims were likely to:

- rent their home
- be sole parent families
- be beneficiaries
- be students
- be Maori.

Repeat burglaries may be explained by *event dependency*, where the same offender returns because they now have 'inside information': they have identified an easy way in, know times when the house is unoccupied, and, probably most important, know what desirable goods are available. Repeats can also be explained in terms of *risk heterogeneity*, where the risk factors that make a property an easy target attract different offenders over time. For example, the design of a house, the surrounding environment, and the positioning of a house in relation to the street or to other housing may contribute to its vulnerability to repeat burglaries (Townsley, Homel and Chaseling 2000).

5.1 What we found

Police staff attending burglary victims generally provided security advice in some form, whether through the Victim Support booklet 'Reducing the risk of burglary' or by providing specially constructed packs of information. Consistency of the approach with burglary victims was believed to:

- provide support and reassurance
- reduce the chances of repeat victimisation
- provide a contact to inform victims of progress
- enhance the chances of recovery of property.

In most areas specialised single-staffed cars were deployed to attend burglary victims, although these resources were vulnerable to demands for staff in other areas, and could not always be ring-fenced throughout the research period.

All four Police Areas had varying degrees of partnership with the Neighbourhood Support (NS) movement, which aimed to increase the sense of safety in neighbourhoods. It was thought that this partnership was effective because:

- Police might receive information leading to an arrest by notifying residents soon after a burglary occurred
- it encouraged the public to observe and report suspicious activity
- it encouraged a sense of pride and ownership in the local neighbourhood
- it created a sense of partnership between communities and the Police.

However, Police, particularly in Manurewa and Rotorua, observed that NS was more difficult to establish in the most at-risk neighbourhoods.

Police in all four areas also worked in partnership with Victim Support (VS), which was based in a local or district Police station or with the local authority (Christchurch). The main aim of referral of burglary victims to VS was to assist the victim to deal with the effects of the burglary, but other secondary aims were also addressed, such as giving security advice and assisting with gathering the information required for investigation.

In Rotorua Police Area, NS and VS combined to carry out a visual street survey of household security and dropped brochures with security advice in letterboxes.

In Manurewa and Rotorua, VS, with assistance from Police, was operating a target hardening programme which provided security equipment to lower socio-economic households which had been burgled more than once within a year.

5.2 The effectiveness of victim-focused interventions

If victim-focused interventions were effective, we would expect to find that:

- the sense of community safety from burglary was increasing
- there was a greater sense of community responsibility for preventing and reporting burglary
- the public and burglary victims were becoming more aware of security and putting security measures in place.

We would also expect that victims would be satisfied with the Police response and feel supported in dealing with the effects of burglary. In relation to offenders, we would expect to find burglars were deterred by security measures or informal guardianship of homes and neighbourhoods.

The household surveys conducted in Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt and Sydenham in 2002 and 2004 showed that participants were significantly less likely in 2004 to think that crime, particularly burglary, was a problem in local neighbourhoods. However, in both years a high proportion of participants in all areas were worried about their house being burgled (ranging from one-half to three-quarters of participants). Manurewa and Rotorua participants were particularly worried, reflecting the higher risk of burglary in those areas. There is little evidence that this resulted in a sense of responsibility for preventing burglary, in that a substantial proportion (between one-quarter and one-half) of burglaries involved an unforced entry through an open window, or an open or unlocked door.

There is strong evidence from the household survey that the risk of victimisation is lowest for households which take simple security precautions (such as telling neighbours when everyone in the household is away, locking doors and having good lighting) as well as households which had comprehensive security (alarms or door and window locks) or a guard dog. These precautions were found to be effective whether or not the household was in any of the risk categories for victimisation, such as being a sole parent, renting, flatting or being a student household.

Victimised households were less likely than other households to have security measures at the time of the burglary, and victims showed a clear tendency to increase security after a burglary. The in-depth interviews with burglary victims also indicated that homes where occupants had no security devices were vulnerable. The proximity of a house to a reserve or walkway was another factor. Ranch slider doors seemed easy to force, suggesting that householders paying particular attention to security at these points may be effective.

A higher proportion of households tended to have specialised security measures—e.g. deadlocks, window locks, security lights or alarms—in all four Police Areas (especially Lower Hutt and Manurewa) compared to the national average. However, there is no evidence that the use of specialised security increased in any of the four areas between 2002 and 2004. The most common reason for not doing more to protect the home in all four areas was that the household could not afford more security. The interviews with victims also showed that victims were torn between the need to secure their property and the desire, which could also

be related to the cultural value *whanaungatanga*, to have a more relaxed, sharing and open lifestyle.

The interviews with burglary offenders confirmed that they were deterred by obvious signs of security, such as alarms or dogs, and by the presence of people either in the house or in the vicinity. Offenders in some areas appeared to go to considerable lengths to check out whether homeowners were absent, including making anonymous phone calls. Over half of the offenders interviewed said they would return to the same house or area to commit burglary. The main motivation was familiarity with the area, house or household contents.

Sherman et al. (1997) conclude that improving security by improving locks and barriers on windows and doors (target hardening) appears to reduce burglaries, but that the effectiveness of this approach is unknown until more rigorous evaluations are available.

Target hardening programmes have been central to a number of successful burglary reduction programmes in the UK (Tilley and Webb 1994; Anderson, Cheney and Pease 1995; Home Office 2003a, 2003b, 2003c) and Australia (Henderson 2002). The evaluation of the New Zealand target hardening pilot programme was inconclusive on the overall effectiveness of the scheme. The findings are clear, however, that the programme reduced householders' fears, including those of children of the household, of further burglary. While the increased security did appear to prevent some repeat burglaries from occurring, not all were prevented, because of failure of recipients to use the security equipment properly or failure of the scheme to secure all entry points. This suggested that improvements could be made to the educational aspects of the programme and to the level of security provided. Improvements were also needed in the lines of referral from Police, so that eligible repeat victims could be identified and all potentially eligible victims could be offered the service (Casey et al. and Segessenmann, 2003). Since the evaluation VS has been implementing these improvements.

Another indication of the effectiveness of victim-focused approaches is the willingness of victims and the wider public to report suspicious behaviour or burglaries to Police. Although the majority of householders surveyed in all areas said they would report suspicious behaviour to the Police, fewer would do this in 2004 than in 2002. There were no significant changes between 2002 and 2004 in the proportions of burglaries reported to Police in any area; reporting rates ranged from 71% to 84% for completed burglaries⁷. Reporting rates were clearly linked with the value of property stolen and the perceived seriousness of the incident, and did not appear to be strongly linked with perceptions of Police effectiveness.

Since the Police in all areas have placed some emphasis on their partnership with NS as a burglary reduction strategy, it is important to examine the evidence for the effectiveness of NS. Participants in the household surveys most frequently mentioned NS as a Police or community initiative to reduce burglary in their neighbourhood. Membership in NS was higher in Manurewa and Rotorua, but decreased significantly in both areas between 2002 and 2004. Members found it helpful because it strengthened the community and helped them to get to know their neighbours.

⁷ Reporting rates for attempted burglaries were considerably lower, estimated at between 21% (Lower Hutt) and 50% (Sydenham) in 2003.

The diversity of objectives, variation of implementation, and diversity of contexts mean NS is an initiative which is almost impossible to evaluate. Sherman et al. (1997) reviewed the studies available and concluded that there was no scientific evidence showing the effectiveness of NS in preventing crime. Studies show that NS groups are most frequently established and have widest participation in relatively affluent areas with low crime rates, and are less frequent and more difficult to initiate and maintain in high-crime-rate areas (Mayhew and Dodds 1994—cited in Laycock and Tilley 1995). Even where NS is established, ongoing involvement is hard to sustain; after an initial burst of activity there tends to be little ongoing programme maintenance, with few meetings and low levels of participation in activities (New Zealand—Hammond 1990; UK—Bennett 1990; Ireland—McKeown and Brosnan 1998).

Victim satisfaction with the Police response to burglary is a further indication of the effectiveness of victim-focused approaches. The conduct of the officer attending a reported burglary has been shown to be the key factor in providing quality of service to victims (Coupe and Griffiths 1996). The household survey showed the service received and the attitude of Police contributed more to victim satisfaction than outcome-related factors. However, the areas where dissatisfaction was highest were the areas where burglary rates were the highest (Manurewa and Rotorua).

The in-depth interviews with burglary victims showed that there was a perception that Police were under-resourced to deal with burglary and usually had more important matters to deal with. Victims were realistic about the level of service they could expect. They were most satisfied when they felt the Police:

- took them seriously
- were empathetic and understanding
- treated them with respect.

Most victims were told when to expect a Police visit and were visited in a reasonable amount of time. The weakest area as far as victims were concerned was a lack of follow-up information about what happened. Overall, victims appreciated the pressures under which Police work and thought that they made considerable effort to attend to burglaries in a timely and considerate way.

The NZNSCV 2001 showed that members of households who experience a burglary are highly affected by the experience, and are generally more affected than victims of assault. This was confirmed by the interviews with burglary victims, some of whom were still distressed some months after the burglaries occurred. While it is not the Police role to provide direct support to victims, they form an important part of the route to support services for victims. The 2004 survey showed that victims in Lower Hutt were most likely to receive advice from Police about further help available, but this is an aspect in which all Police Areas could improve their practice. The proportion of victims who were advised by Police about further help available ranged from 24% (Manurewa) to 60% (Lower Hutt).

In general the evidence shows that burglary reduction strategies could be enhanced by an increased focus on victims, particularly repeat victims. Over the evaluation period, there was

some reduction in the proportion of people who thought crime was a problem, but no evidence that householders were:

- taking greater care to secure properties
- joining NS
- more willing to report suspicious behaviour or burglary to Police.

All of the sources of information for this project provide strong evidence that encouraging victims and the public to take simple security actions, such as locking, lighting and liaising with neighbours, is likely to reduce risk of burglary.

5.3 Good practice in victim-focused interventions

The following ideas for good practice in victim-focused interventions have been drawn from the case studies carried out in each area as well as from the international literature. They are included as practices that have worked in specific contexts at some times, and are intended as a source of good ideas rather than a prescriptive list.

5.3.1 Partnership with Neighbourhood Support

Some examples of good practice in partnership with NS include:

- careful selection of the right person for the job of coordinating NS
- NS seeking secure and adequate funding for coordinator
- street coordinators distributing information to neighbourhoods via telephone tree, email or letter box drops
- NS organising volunteers who are WINZ or ACC clients to carry out letter box drops in localities where burglaries have occurred
- NS coordinator gathering and disseminating information promptly after a burglary by having access to the Police daily tasking sheets
- NS coordinator carefully checking with Police any information being passed on to the community
- Community Constables attending initial meetings of newly established groups
- NS coordinator attending weekly crime meetings
- Police responding when members of the public call in to report suspicious behaviour
- Police Areas providing assistance 'in kind' such as accommodation and administrative support
- NS supplying articles to community newspapers to increase community awareness of burglary and burglary prevention
- VS and NS liaising

- ‘thinking laterally’ in terms of introducing new ideas for involving the community in taking responsibility for safety
- NS using the likelihood of repeat victimisation to establish small NS groups in high-risk areas resembling cocoon watches (Laycock and Tilley 1995; Forrester et al. 1988, 1990): cocoons are formed by the residents immediately around a burgled dwelling, who are asked to look out and report any suspicious activity and provided with security advice
- Police asking victims to contact neighbours themselves and to supply neighbours with an information kit including security advice (South Australian Crime Prevention Unit, 2002).

5.3.2 Partnership with Victim Support

Examples of good practice in working in partnership with VS include:

- prompt referral of all burglary offence reports to VS
- a set of guidelines negotiated by VS groups with local Police or the Policing Communications Centre relating to when a burglary victim should be referred to VS, e.g. if an offender is disturbed on the scene, if the occupant is distressed, if the occupant lives alone
- improvement of data entry and recovery systems to enable prompt referral and identification of repeat victims
- VS trains Police officers new to the area on aspects of their service
- reminders for Communications Center staff and Police to refer victims to VS provided in the form of ‘Remember Victim Support channel x’ stickers for computers, car dashboards and notebooks
- book *Harry and the burglar* distributed by VS to burgled households where there are children
- VS provides information on dealing with and preventing burglary on VS website.

5.3.3 Police practice with victims

The following are examples of good practice in Police practice with victims.

- Police attend residential burglaries within 24 hours.
- Police deal with victims with empathy and respect.
- Police provide a comprehensive Burglary Attendance pack sponsored by local businesses including:
 - the booklet ‘Reducing the risk of burglary’
 - ‘Stolen property list’
 - a locksmith voucher
 - magnetized security checklist

- serial number record sheet
 - NS and VS pamphlets
 - victim information letter signed by the attending officer
 - Complaint Acknowledgment Form with the Police file number.
- Include security assessments at all burgled residences and provide crime prevention information packages as a routine part of the Police standard response to burglary (Taplin et al. 2001).
 - Examine issues contributing to victimisation of specific communities, e.g. students or immigrants, and put specific strategies in place.
 - Respond promptly, and officer(s) pay attention to reassuring the victim and keeping victims informed about progress (Coupe and Griffiths 1996; Gill et al. 1996; Holder, Makkai and Payne 2004).

5.3.4 Target hardening scheme

Examples of good practice in target hardening schemes include:

- Improve the lines of referral from Police to VS to ensure potential recipients receive prompt service
- Notify VS promptly of repeat burglary victims so that eligible victims and recipients of the scheme can be followed up promptly.

6 Property-focused interventions

Property-focused interventions are those intended to reduce the anticipated rewards of burglary and to increase the risks of handling 'hot' property. Property-focused strategies aim to:

- interrupt the supply and demand chains of the market
- increase the probability of detecting those distributing stolen goods
- make stolen items more easily identifiable by property marking and recording of serial numbers.

6.1 What we found

All Police Areas focused on the second-hand property market from time to time, but with other, more pressing, demands on Police time this effort had not always been consistent. The approach centred around visits to second-hand dealers to remind them of their obligations under the Secondhand Dealers Act 1963⁸, to check their registers of goods purchased, and to update Police registers of dealers. The work was often done by special burglary squads. The visits were important in establishing a relationship between Police and traders which could be mutually beneficial. Traders would ring Police when they suspected someone was trying to sell stolen property or when owners identified stolen property in their premises. The trader benefits by avoiding buying goods that might later be confiscated. It was thought that:

- offenders would be deterred from selling goods to traders
- stolen property could be recovered
- some burglars would be apprehended either directly or through identifying stolen property, leading to clearances for other burglaries and uncovering stolen property distribution networks.

Police checks of second-hand registers could identify new sellers of stolen property.

New New Zealand legislation governing pawnbrokers and second-hand dealers came into effect in April 2005 (after the conclusion of the information-gathering phase of this study). The new legislation was expected to facilitate Police property-focused interventions. Key changes in the legislation were:

- introducing a five-year license with stringent licensing and certification conditions

⁸ The Secondhand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Act 2004 came into effect in April 2005, after the period of this research.

- updating a schedule of at-risk goods required to be retained for a period before on-selling
- requiring that dealers maintain a register that records the name and address details of anyone they have purchased goods from, verified by signature and photo identification.

In Counties-Manukau, Operation SNAP developed through a partnership of Police with the Insurance Council to encourage households to mark property and record serial numbers. This information was stored on a central database and could be checked through an 0800 number. While there was little activity on SNAP early in the research period, in 2004 the new Intel Unit in Manurewa revived the programme.

6.2 Evidence for the effectiveness of property-focused interventions

If the mechanisms associated with property-focused interventions were working as envisaged, we would expect to find that:

- second-hand dealers were working cooperatively with Police
- offenders perceived that selling to second-hand dealers was risky
- victims and the general public marked or photographed their property and recorded serial numbers
- victims and the general public were aware of Police efforts to close down the selling of stolen property.

Internationally, property marking is seen as an important part of comprehensive market reduction strategies. Property marking schemes encourage engraving, marking or photographing items and recording the serial numbers of any property likely to be targeted. Houses containing items marked in this way may also have window stickers advertising that their property is marked.

In the household surveys in the four Police Areas, 23–36% of participants said they had marked their property and recorded serial numbers and 14–26% had photographed small items. While this indicates a modest uptake of this practice, there was no increase in the proportions engaging in this practice from 2002 to 2004.

Sherman et al. (1997) conclude that the effectiveness of property marking in reducing burglary is uncertain. A successful Welsh demonstration property marking project had a very high take-up rate and was highly publicised across the area, with window stickers displayed by most participants (Laycock 1985). An evaluation of an unsuccessful Canadian property marking programme found an increased burglary rate over the 18 months following the intervention programme (Gabor 1981—cited in Sherman et al. 1997).

Information from interviews with offenders internationally indicates that second-hand and pawnbroker outlets form only one avenue in a diverse stolen goods market which may involve a range of other businesses, drug dealers and, more informally, the social networks of the offenders (Cromwell, Olson and Avary 1991; Wright and Decker 1994; Stevenson and

Forsythe 1998; Nelson, Collins and Gant 2002). Burglary offenders interviewed for this project stated they most commonly looked for items that could be sold easily and quickly, could be exchanged for drugs, or could be easily carried. Money, jewelry and electronic items were most frequently mentioned. Most offenders sold goods to 'unspecified contacts' and around one-quarter had sold to each of second-hand shops, drug dealers or friends. There was some evidence that some offenders avoided using second-hand dealers as an outlet for stolen goods. Two of the offenders interviewed had been apprehended by selling stolen goods to dealers and another was worried about this possibility.

Second-hand dealers interviewed for this research were mixed in their comments about the relationship with Police. Some were frustrated that when they did try to contact Police about suspicious people or items, they felt they were treated as criminals and their livelihood threatened, or the information was not acted upon. They rarely got feedback from Police when property was taken and almost never received restitution from the Courts. A few dealers said they had passed information to the Police hotline, resulting in the apprehension of offenders. Some were cautious in the steps they would take to detain suspects while contacting Police as they felt vulnerable to later intimidation. Some traders reported a good relationship with Police and appreciated having a direct line to known officers and receiving a speedy response.

The market reduction approach (MRA) was trialed in the UK in 1999–2002 to test a strategic framework (put forward by Sutton, Johnston and Lockwood 1998 and Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington 2001) for targeting stolen goods markets (Hale et al. 2004). Neither project area demonstrated any impact on burglary figures, but a great deal was learnt about the Intel gathering and analysis process required to map property markets, about the nature of the local stolen property markets, and about multi-agency cooperation. Liaison with second-hand traders was seen as a productive aspect of the UK MRA initiatives. Information from Intel gathering indicated that offenders were very aware of the projects and had stopped using second-hand shops to dispose of stolen property. Feedback from traders indicated that many genuinely supported the initiatives.

Two recent UK MRA trials also included extensive publicity campaigns to engage the public by seeking information about local stolen property markets and by educating about the costs of purchasing stolen goods (Hale et al. 2004). However, this publicity seemed to have little impact on public behaviour and the report concluded it was not a cost-effective approach at local project level.

Overall the evidence suggests that liaison with second-hand dealers and the mapping of property markets are worthwhile interventions as part of comprehensive market reduction strategies. The surprising extent of the involvement of the general public internationally in stolen goods markets (Cromwell, Olson and Avary 1991; Sutton, Johnston and Lockwood 1998; Allen 2000) supports the suggestion that, in the long term, burglary reduction initiatives could be supported by public education campaigns which create a better understanding of the implications of complicity in crime.

6.3 Good practice in property-focused interventions

The following ideas for good practice in property-focused interventions have been drawn from the case studies carried out in each area as well as from the international literature. They are included as practices that have worked in specific contexts at some times, and are intended as a source of good ideas rather than a prescriptive list.

6.3.1 Liaison with second-hand dealers

The following are examples of good practice in liaising with second-hand dealers.

- Consistently
 - visit all second-hand dealers in the area regularly
 - inspect registers and property
 - obtain lists of sellers
 - check stolen property lists with traders (e.g. Operation Steptoe, Canterbury District).
- Appoint one or two staff for liaison with traders so lines of communication are clear.
- Encourage communication between traders in identifying possible sellers of stolen property.
- Improve liaison with traders across all Police Areas so that local burglars don't take property to dealers elsewhere.
- Improve relationships with second-hand dealers by:
 - liaising regularly with dealers
 - acting on information from dealers
 - giving them feedback
 - fostering rapport
 - faxing them a list of known targets, prison releasees, or types of property.
- Institute proactive weeks bringing together a team from all sections to visit second-hand dealers.
- Develop a local register of dealers.
- Supply second-hand dealers with an information pack including:
 - copies of the new legislation
 - lists of stolen property
 - serial numbers of stolen goods
 - signs for display on the premises (Operation Crackle, Lower Hutt).

6.3.2 Market reduction approach

The following are examples of good practice in using MRA.

- Obtain up-to-date information about local stolen goods markets by questioning victims, offenders, shopkeepers, traders, and informants.
- Encourage members of the public to pass on information directly and indirectly through avenues for anonymous crime reporting.
- Put in place a multi-agency approach to strategise and implement initiatives, involving, for example, local authorities (Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington 2001).
- Allow a sufficient length of time (up to 18 months) to get sufficient understanding of local markets and develop appropriate intervention strategies.
- Identify 'hot' products.
- Target harden by making property easier to trace by property marking measures.
- Address the 'handlers' who purchase and distribute stolen goods.
- Institute public education campaigns to create greater understanding of the risks and consequences of being part of the market (Australian Institute of Criminology 2005).

6.3.3 Other good property-focused practices

The following are examples of other good property-focused practices.

- Focus on other potential receivers, such as gangs and those selling over the Internet.
- Retain flexibility to focus on organised crime as a way of obtaining information on property markets.
- Comprehensively record property in offence reports, including make, model, and serial number.
- Promptly store and retrieve serial numbers of stolen property electronically in NIA for ease of checking recoveries on search warrants or second-hand dealer enquiries.
- Encourage insurance companies and retailers nationally to play more part in ensuring serial numbers are recorded.
- Encourage victims to record property serial numbers and take photographs of precious items.
- Encourage victims to circulate inventories to local second-hand shops.
- Engage broader participation in property marking as a burglary reduction strategy, for example from the public, Police, manufacturers and the insurance industry.

Technological advances offer the possibility of developing 'smart goods', designing in anti-theft features such as unique markers, security coding, and password or PIN protection for electronic goods that make the items usable only by owners.

The insurance industry could offer incentives to clients who have recorded and reported identifying details for stolen items.

7 Location-focused interventions

Interventions for reducing burglary at the level of location are aimed at increasing the guardianship of the area, reducing the likelihood that offenders will locate suitable targets, and increasing the effort and risks for potential offenders—for example:

- through an increased Police presence
- through developing the community's capacity to discourage offending
- through environmental changes to reduce the vulnerability of the area.

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and Secured by design (SBD) are situational crime reduction approaches applied at the location level and are based on reducing the opportunities to offend by changes and improvements to environmental and building design through:

- improving physical security
- improving natural informal surveillance
- designing in ways that inhibit the likelihood of outsiders traveling through and becoming familiar with an area
- maintaining an area in good order to portray an image to offenders that crime will be noticed.

7.1 What we found

All four Police Areas had incorporated directed patrolling (DP) into standard operational practice during the period of study. DP involves identifying and applying Police resources to 'hot' spots where burglary is prevalent, and is based on the premises that:

- a high proportion of crime occurs in a small proportion of locations
- criminals offend within a predictable distance from their home
- criminals have corridors through which they move to offend.

The more precisely patrols focus on 'hot' spots and 'hot' times of criminal activity, the less crime there will be at those places and times. Whole-of-policing approaches to DP were tried when resources were available, involving varying mixes of general duties units, traffic units, youth aid, community police and CIB. The role of Intel was central, both in providing information to direct operations and in recording and analysing Intel gathered in the course of DP operations.

DP was believed to work because:

- the visibility of Police deterred burglary and other criminal activity
- people in neighbourhoods where crime had occurred observed patrolling and were reassured
- targeting areas where burglary was occurring, which were also likely to be areas where burglars lived, provided an opportunity to gather information about recidivist offenders
- stolen property might be identified in cars stopped
- impounding the vehicles of disqualified drivers might impede burglaries.

Rotorua also had two groups of volunteers, initially established to patrol tourist attractions, who extended their work to conducting patrols in residential and rural areas experiencing crime problems: Community Watch and Western Heights cycle patrol. Sydenham had a Community Watch group who were part of a district-wide group of volunteer patrollers and who reported suspicious activity, people or vehicles to Police. Police believed that these groups deterred offenders from operating in these areas.

Rotorua Police were increasingly involved with CPTED in partnership with the Rotorua District Council during the research period, although the initial projects have been within the central business district and tourist areas. Fordlands in Rotorua and Clendon in Manurewa were also two of five areas involved in the Housing New Zealand Community Renewal programme, which aimed to address issues such as transience, crime and lack of safety in these areas. In Clendon, the community appearance was improved by fixing broken fences, tidying up derelict areas and painting. Safety issues have been addressed by:

- installing security lights
- upgrading locks
- installing creative fencing
- installing solid timber exterior doors.

High wooden fences were replaced with fences allowing for visibility in areas with tightly concentrated houses with shared rights of way. The installation of heated flooring in houses was reducing transience. A fence was constructed to reduce access to Housing New Zealand properties along a commonly used walkway. This has become a community development initiative resulting in the formation of a residents' group who also acted as a neighbourhood support group in relationship with Police.

7.2 The evidence for effectiveness of location-focused interventions

If the mechanisms by which location-focused interventions were believed to operate were effective, we would expect to find that:

- local offenders were aware of DP and community patrols
- they said they were deterred by this activity
- other members of those communities were aware of the patrols and were reassured by them.

This section will also examine the international evidence for the effectiveness of location-focused interventions.

The interviews with burglary offenders for this research showed that, after NS, 'Police increasing their patrolling' was the most frequently mentioned unprompted Police or community initiative to reduce burglary in their area. Almost half of those interviewed said they were aware of increased Police patrolling, and less than one-quarter said they were aware of community patrols when prompted. When asked whether they thought particular initiatives were effective in stopping burglaries, most thought increasing Police patrols would be effective. There was some evidence that the presence of Police was a deterrent, although many said that they could 'get around' Police patrolling, for example by driving into driveways or using aliases when pulled over and questioned.

The household surveys also showed that Police patrolling was the initiative to reduce burglary that householders were most likely to be aware of after Neighbourhood Support. Between 2002 and 2004 there was a significant increase in the proportion of householders who were aware of both Police and community patrols in Manurewa. In all four areas, of those who would like the Police to do more to make them feel safer from burglary, the greatest support was for more visibility or patrolling. This indicates that, for this group at least, Police visibility tended to be reassuring. However, substantial proportions said there was nothing more they would like the Police to do to make them feel safer from burglary.

Police in all areas had observed that no burglaries occurred in areas during DP. However, an unintended consequence of DP was observed by Rotorua and Lower Hutt community respondents for this research, who said that state housing tenants felt targeted by a heightened Police presence and believed it gave their communities a negative reputation. Police in Rotorua believed that the volunteer community patrols became known to offenders who were deterred from offending in those suburbs.

DP is rated as an effective approach to reducing crime by Sherman et al. (1997) in their review of what works. The scientifically robust evidence for this comes from evaluations of the effectiveness of 'hot' spot patrols in reducing street crime, outdoor crime and crime on subways, rather than in reducing residential burglary. Jordan (1998) also stated that police patrols directed at 'hot' spots were effective, but cautioned that DP at this level would need to be used with care to avoid provoking negative reactions in the community.

Directed 'hot' spot patrolling has been incorporated as part of effective burglary reduction initiatives elsewhere (e.g. Queensland Criminal Justice Commission 2001; Chenery, Holt and Pease 1997; Ratcliffe 2001; Makkai et al. 2004). These 'hot' spot interventions reduced offending, although apparently only temporarily, with no displacement of burglary into surrounds. These 'hot' spots were in disadvantaged areas which also had a long history of

police attention, and therefore residents had a high degree of cynicism about police efforts to improve the situation.

Aggressive patrol, traffic enforcement, drink driving enforcement, intensive field interviews, and street-level drug enforcement have all been shown to help reduce burglaries in studies reviewed by Scott (2003). By contrast, random or non-directed patrols have been found to be ineffective in reducing crime (Sherman et al. 1997; Jordan 1998).

CPTED approaches have contributed to the success of burglary reduction initiatives in the UK Reducing Burglary Initiative projects (Home Office 2003b, 2003c, 2003d). The police-led UK initiative called SBD encouraged the construction industry to adopt effective crime prevention measures in home and estate design in the UK. Armitage (2000) showed that the incidence of recorded crime on SBD housing estates was considerably lower than that on non-SBD counterparts, with no evidence to suggest that the burglary reductions resulted in increases in other likely offences. Residents in SBD estates reported lower levels of fear of crime.

There is strong evidence that location-focused interventions are effective in reducing burglary, particularly as part of comprehensive, multicomponent burglary reduction strategies.

7.3 Good practice in location-focused interventions

The following ideas for good practice in location-focused interventions have been drawn from the case studies carried out in each area as well as from the international literature. They are included as practices that have worked in specific contexts at some times, and are intended as a source of good ideas rather than a prescriptive list.

7.3.1 Directed patrolling

The following are examples of good practice in DP.

- Tailor maps to produce a Patrolling Report for each shift, so that early, late and night shifts receive reports of incidents during the hours of their shift in the previous week, by locality.
- Inform staff of DP responsibilities at weekly crime meeting and daily briefings.
- Identify the high-risk streets and allocate two streets to two officers who carry out a letter box drop encouraging householders to contact them about anything suspicious.
- Randomly check cars at check points, actively check bail, and carry out covert and overt patrols in allocated streets (Operation Monopoly, Manurewa)
- Utilise 'whole-of-policing' approach to locations, involving traffic, community policing, youth aid and other sections.
- Also involve community partners such as NS, volunteer patrols and crime watch groups.

Particular sections of the police can take responsibility for certain practices.

- Intel provides maps detailing the most recent burglaries, theft from cars and unlawful takings; record time of day, property stolen, and MO.
- Staff sign Directed Patrolling Reports to emphasise their accountability for achieving those directives and sergeants reinforce this.
- The shift sergeant directs staff to patrol areas in marked cars or uniformed foot patrols.
- Officers take handwritten notings of activity, persons or vehicles of interest in the area on DPR sheets and provide to Intel.
- Units provide verbal reports to Intel at daily briefings.
- Intel monitors each section's DP response, report this at weekly crime meeting, and include this in the performance assessment of individual staff and section units.
- Traffic section positions checkpoints and road patrols in the same area, gather information to feed back to Intel; copies traffic infringement tickets for people or vehicles known to Police and give to Intel.

7.3.2 International good practice in location-focused interventions

- Offer all residences (victims and non-victims) in the 'hot' spot area free home security assessments and support with property marking; Police and volunteers offer specialised burglary prevention training through door knocks and letter box drops (The Break and Enter Project—Queensland Criminal Justice Commission 2001; Henderson 2002).
- Institute directed patrolling as one component at the higher levels of a graduated response to repeat victimisation delivered on the basis of prior victimisation. The initial bronze level response to those burgled provides crime prevention advice and target hardening and establishes cocoon watch. Minimum twice-weekly Police watch forms part of the silver response, and daily Police patrols and higher-level security measures are part of the gold level response (The Olympic Model, Huddersfield 'Biting Back' project—Chenery, Holt and Pease 1997; Anderson, Chenery and Pease 1995).
- 'The key to making crackdowns work is to keep them short and unpredictable. Long-term police crackdowns all show a "decay" in their deterrent effects over time... Random rotation of high police visibility across different short-term targets can accumulate free crime-prevention bonuses and get the most value out of police visibility. Even if displacement to other hot spots occurs, the unpredictable increases in police presence at any hot spot may create generally higher deterrent effects from the same number of police officers.' (Sherman 1990)

7.3.3 Crime prevention through environmental design

Examples of good CPTED practices include:

- develop CPTED in partnership with local authority and local businesses (Rotorua)

- undertake crime and safety audits in area of high crime activity to identify problem features such as poor lighting, poor visibility, and the design of footpaths and foot bridges through reserves.

CPTED initiatives in the UK included:

- improved street lighting
- environmental improvements following architectural surveys of 'hot' spots
- improvements to fencing and installed alley-gates.

7.3.4 Volunteer patrols

Examples of good practice with volunteer patrols include:

- establish volunteer patrols in high-crime neighbourhoods concerned about the reputation frequent Police presence gives their community
- seek volunteers through WINZ and ACC community work schemes
- establish partnerships with local authority, charitable trusts, local businesses, and WINZ or ACC to run volunteer patrols
- set standards and train volunteers in personal safety and how to take effective Intel notings
- support volunteers to complete the security guard training course
- obtain Police clearance for volunteers
- arrange for volunteer groups to meet weekly with Intel to discuss areas or activity of interest
- ensure volunteers carry cell phones and supervisor has a Police radio
- use the Community Policing Centre as a base
- provide feedback from Police to community patrollers on action relating to the information they report
- maintain a highly motivated coordinator, secure funding and a stable relationship with Police.

8 Police organisation

The previous sections have presented strong evidence of the effectiveness of burglary reduction strategies targeting 'hot' offenders, victims, locations and property. This section draws together information on the ways in which the Police Areas have organised their resources to enable them to employ these strategies. It will look at what we know of international best practice in Police structure and organisation, including the specialist units that deal with burglary. In light of this, we will consider the ways in which the four Police Areas have organised and carried out specialist and support functions for reducing burglary.

8.1 Police response to burglary

Internationally, burglary is an offence with a low resolution rate. And investigative processes account for only a small proportion of resolutions. For example, Coupe and Griffiths (1996) showed that in the UK only 6% of burglaries were solved by primary detection. Less than half of these were solved by catching offenders at or near the scene, and around one-third from evidence obtained from witnesses. Subsequent investigation and the use of forensic evidence accounted for 10% or less of primary resolutions. Nevertheless, investigation leading to the apprehension and prosecution of offenders can have a marked impact on burglary incident rates, because the bulk of burglary offences can be concentrated among a few recidivist offenders.

Investigative processes for burglary tend to be highly complex with a number of interdependent functions. The review of the international literature carried out for this research came to the following conclusions about the elements of effective investigations.

The success of burglary investigations is determined by:

- the quality of investigative actions by the first officers on the scene
- the timing and management of forensics staff involvement
- effective screening and allocation of cases for further investigative action.

Each of these is facilitated by:

- establishing systematic routines for:
 - initial scene investigations
 - screening and allocation of cases
 - prompt data entry, briefings and interagency communications
- encouraging simple informed action in addition to the sophisticated analyses

- maintaining the flexibility to respond to opportunities as they arise.

8.2 Emergency response

Research has shown that rapid responses to in-progress burglaries enable burglars to be caught more often (Blake and Coupe 2001), and are more successful where police arrive in less than five minutes, and respond with more than one patrol (Coupe and Griffiths 1996; Blake and Coupe 2001).

In New Zealand, the work of the Police Communication Centres is crucial to ensuring rapid response. The Northern, Central and Southern Communication Centres (Comms) provide the key interface between the public and the frontline staff in Police areas. The staff aims to have all incidents attended in order of priority, as quickly as possible. The communications centre fields a range of calls in relation to burglary—reports of suspicious behaviour, burglars on the premises, and historic burglaries. The quality of the information taken is crucial to the ability of Police to respond effectively. Police staff in all areas expressed some frustration with delays in receiving ‘priority one’ calls and the quality of information received from Comms.

Emergency response (ER) is provided by 24-hour, seven-day shifts of Police Units. In all areas except Manurewa this was organised at area level. A restructuring of the Counties-Manukau Police District in 2003 moved emergency response to area level in Manurewa, to counter the slower response times experienced in providing a district-wide service.

8.2.1 Good practice in emergency response

The following are examples of good practice in ER.

- Comms call takers gather as much detail as possible to relay to ER staff responding to the incident when an offender is present or has just left or there has been violence, e.g.:
 - where
 - when (if possible)
 - mode of entry
 - what was taken (e.g. firearms)
 - damage done
 - mode of exit
 - when Police could attend
 - violence or injury
 - suspicious behaviour near the scene.
- Comms dispatchers are dedicated to one policing area, but rostering allows experience in other areas.

- Comms staff members visit their area to develop local knowledge and get to know the staff.
- Comms provides information to the caller, when possible, regarding attendance, scene protection and VS.
- Comms dispatch priority one calls within two minutes and respond within ten minutes.
- If a call is a priority one incident, dispatcher:
 - oversees establishing a cordon around the area
 - calls Police dog handler and monitors a search
 - keeps callers on the line so that updated information can be fed through to frontline staff.
- Comms make appropriate referrals to VS.
- Where possible, Comms staff follow up with members of the public who ring in with reports.
- Comms shifts are rostered to allow overlap of shifts for training and briefing.
- Call takers should record more than one phone number for the victim if possible.

8.3 Initial investigation

Gill et al. (1996) found that the initial police investigation was the most significant factor in resolving burglary. All other investigators depend on the quality of information and evidence from these initial enquiries and first attending officers needed sufficient time to undertake thorough investigations to generate comprehensive crime reports. Gill et al. recommended that first investigators do more to locate witnesses and conduct house-to-house enquiries.

Taylor and Hirst (1995) advocated the formation of specialist teams to visit house burglary scenes to improve the quality of both evidence gathering and the service to burglary victims. Members of these teams became better informed and more skilful because of the volume of initial investigations they were undertaking.

During the research period, most of the areas studied had deployed dedicated single-staffed cars (known as Q-Cars or, in Rotorua, the Burglary Takings Squad) to conduct burglary investigations so that there was a consistent first contact with victims and high-quality initial investigation, and so that general duties staff were freed for urgent work. Dedicated staffing could not always be sustained and was vulnerable to the needs for resourcing of more urgent work. At the end of the research period, Canterbury Southern (incorporating the former Sydenham area) was introducing a Burglary Desk to enable offence reports for historic burglaries to be taken by phone, with Scene of Crime Officers (SOCO) then attending every burglary.

8.3.1 Good practice in initial investigation

The following are examples of good practice in initial investigation.

- Appoint a specialised unit for initial investigation of burglary to ensure promptness, quality investigation, quality offence reports, and quality of service to victims.
- Develop and implement standards for burglary attendance to enhance victim satisfaction and the chances of resolving the burglary by:
 - developing a template for recording requirements, e.g. 'Burglary Offence Report' (POL 23), with a checklist approach to improve the recording, input and electronic retrieval of information on the household, property taken, the scene, the entry, interior and exit, and suspects and area enquiries
 - developing a thorough and consistent process including a brief scene examination, interviews of household members, more detailed scene examination, referral to SOCO, and conducting area enquiries.
- Start work early in the morning to interview victims before they leave for work, allaying anxiety and ensuring recent information is obtained.
- Train and supervise officers in initial investigation, including having SOCO train officers in scene assessment.
- Rotate general duties staff to the specialised unit periodically.
- Take time to conduct enquiries in the neighbourhood of a burglary.
- Arrange for initial investigators to participate in a weekly meeting on burglary investigation with SOCO, Intel and strategy manager to pool information and reduce isolation of the unit.
- Establish a dedicated phone number for the use of victims of burglary.
- Conduct initial investigation seven days a week in high-volume areas.
- Refer appropriately to SOCO, to avoid fruitlessly raising victims' expectations or missing opportunities to gather evidence.

8.4 Forensic work

Williams (2004) found that there were significant gains to be made from reviewing the management of Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs) and their organisational positioning to integrate CSEs into the whole investigative process. He concluded that better results were achieved if forensics staff were involved as expert collaborators in the whole investigative process rather than as technical assistants. The higher-performing forensics units contributed to post-identification investigations and the development of divisional priorities and initiatives.

Operation VENDAS in NSW used forensic science to successfully target volume crime offenders (Spence 2003). This was achieved by:

- maximising SOCOs' visits to crime scenes
- fast-tracking fingerprint and DNA sample processing
- managing the flow of information following positive identifications
- prioritising investigations focused on arresting the offenders.

Burglary offenders have an awareness of the capabilities of forensic investigation and, for some, this has meant taking a more cautious approach to burglary (Hearnden and Magill 2004). In the interviews with offenders carried out for this research, more than half were confident of avoiding detection using a range of strategies, which included covering hands to avoid leaving fingerprints. Strategies to avoid leaving material for potential DNA matching were not mentioned.

All of the areas studied had SOCO units at either district or area level. They:

- visited crime scenes which had been identified in the initial investigation as potentially containing physical evidence
- examined the scene
- collected exhibits and samples
- assessed the materials
- performed tests
- sent materials to the national forensic laboratory if further tests were indicated.

8.4.1 Good practice in forensic investigation

Some good practices followed by SOCOs include:

- attend burglary scenes promptly, a common standard being within 24 hours, to avoid scene contamination
- attend as many burglary scenes as possible, including those for seemingly minor offences, to increase the chances of obtaining evidence
- collect fingerprints, DNA and other evidence such as tool-mark impressions and footprints
- focus on obtaining fingerprints as the quickest, easiest, most cost-effective way of identifying an offender
- prioritise the selection of scenes or samples for DNA profiling, since the cost is significant
- train general duties staff to ensure care in handling, storing and recording of evidence
- participate in a weekly meeting of investigating officers, specialised squad, Intel and strategy manager to maximize SOCO contribution to burglary Intel
- appear in court for not guilty pleas, as this tends to have a convincing effect on juries

- photograph burgled premises, for use in interviews with apprehended offenders.

Some good practices followed by SOCO units include:

- have a small enthusiastic and dedicated SOCO team with a consistent approach to increase the quantity and quality of evidence collected
- institute a system of recognition and reward for frontline staff involved in fingerprint matches, e.g. those who obtain a voluntary fingerprint which results in a match, or those who carry out a quality scene investigation leading to a match.

8.4.2 Good practice in ongoing investigation

Examples of good practice in an ongoing investigation include:

- reactivate a file and forward it to an investigating officer when a fingerprint or DNA match is received, or other lead is established to an identifiable suspect
- produce an offender package with other burglaries in the same period and area, a list of suspect's recorded associates, and a list of stolen property when a fingerprint or DNA match is received
- check second-hand dealers for property (investigating staff)
- interview suspects, question them about other burglaries, stolen property and involvement of associates and encourage them to provide a DNA sample (investigating staff)
- seek to establish grounds for a search warrant.

8.5 Specialised burglary squads

Many of the initiatives that have positively impacted on the burglary rate have employed special squads focused on burglary or on particular aspects of a strategy targeting volume crime. Dedicated squads to enable greater use of Intel and targeting of offenders were key factors in the effectiveness of the strategies for combating burglary adopted by three UK police forces evaluated by Stockdale and Gresham (1995). A burglary squad was formed and disbanded on several occasions by the Merseyside police, with a substantial reduction in residential burglaries on each occasion it was formed (Gresty and Taylor 1995).

There are arguments for and against the formation of specialised burglary squads. Stockdale and Gresham (1995) recommended that forming specialist squads is good practice which enables a proactive approach to burglary reduction. The formation of dedicated squads offers the benefits of specialist knowledge, skills and expertise, and a committed accountable resource protected from concerns that may distract from the targeted crimes.

However, the separation of proactive targeted work from reactive policing requires close cooperation to ensure the exchange of information and liaison on operational matters. Special burglary squads can reduce responsibility of other Police for burglary and foster elitism. Stockdale and Gresham (1995) suggest that squad members be rotated so that squads are integral to overall service, with close liaison with CID and uniformed officers. White (2001)

referred to the benefits of the more focused training that was possible and the high level of staff commitment and job satisfaction which could result. However, he found that the formation of special squads diminished the coverage and effectiveness of police patrols, and such squads may operate with little knowledge or regard for local work.

In 2000, Counties-Manukau and Bay of Plenty Police Districts received new government funding to establish LETs whose purpose was to focus on burglary reduction and increasing the resolution rate for burglary. Rather than to attend burglaries, their role was to utilise Intel and forensic data to develop profiles on key offenders and bring them before the Court. The LETs covered several Police Areas each. The LETs received files with identifiable MO and combined this information with forensic and Intel data to construct profiles of offenders or offences. When they had gathered enough evidence they conducted searches of known offenders. A key strategy was to interview burglars being held at Police stations, encouraging them to confess historic burglaries and provide voluntary DNA samples. By 2004, in both districts, LETs had been divided and deployed at area level under the Area Commander control.

Rotorua also operated a 'Strategic Section', which was rotated from the General Duties Units every five weeks. Their role was to carry out proactive work such as bail checks and directed patrols. In practice this section was frequently called away to other duties and staff in the area generally believed a more permanent squad to do this work would be more effective.

Lower Hutt staff believed one of the most important burglary reduction strategies in their area was the establishment of a Tactical Response Group charged with working with second-hand dealers, burglary, and gangs.

Canterbury District had, in 1991, formed a District Break Squad, which maintained an overview of burglary and coordinated Police proactive work across the Christchurch metropolitan area. However, communication between the Squad and Police Areas was at times problematic, and in 2002 a Sydenham Break Squad was formed, and later the Sydenham Proactive Squad focusing on organised crime, burglaries and methamphetamine-based drugs, was formed. A new structure in 2004 retained the Central Break Squad and established Volume of Crime Squads to be proactive in burglary, theft from cars and car theft in the metropolitan Police Areas.

8.5.1 Good practice in specialised burglary squads

Examples of good practice in specialised burglary squads include:

- select staff who are dedicated and hard-working, experienced in frontline policing, and have skills in gathering information from offenders and associates
- combine CIB experience with uniformed officers to enhance the training of newer staff
- ensure the squad is responsive and able to take immediate action when there is a strong lead
- implement initiatives with offender, victim, location and property focuses
- work on the streets in plain clothes

- appoint clerical staff to manage files and paperwork
- ring-fence the members from other duties
- keep local areas informed of special squad activity
- cultivate informants and follow up on information received
- build up a district-wide picture of offenders
- establish good communication with other sections, e.g. Intel, CIB, and Prosecutions, and other agencies, e.g. NS, WINZ
- offer to help out in other sections, such as CIB, traffic or General Duties, to gather information on burglary and create goodwill, resulting in information being passed to the specialised squad by other units
- work flexible hours as required
- establish clear team management to ensure cohesion and direction, and institute strict accountability requirements
- establish an 0800 tip-off line and promote it in media releases
- have the experienced staff in the unit provide good modeling and use the unit as a training ground for less experienced staff
- prioritise files to avoid becoming overburdened by a large number of investigative files.

8.6 Intelligence

Effective crime reduction strategies focusing on targeting 'hot' offenders, 'hot' victims and 'hot' spots require a capacity to analyse and identify who and where these targets are. This is the arena of Intel and crime analysis.

'Intel' refers to a structure, a process and a product (Ratcliffe 2003). As a structure, Intel refers to the Intel unit, its staff, resources, methods, skills, and organisational structure (both within the unit and within the police force). As a process, Intel refers to the continuous cycle of data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback. As a product, Intel refers to both the reports produced (from long-term area-wide assessments, to profiling a particular crime problem, to offender profiling) and to the presentation of information to 'decision-makers' who will act on the basis of the Intel they receive. Ratcliffe extends the clarity of 'taking apart' Intel with his triangular Three 'I' representation of the role of Intel, which shows the Intel unit *interpreting* the criminal environment and *influencing* decision-makers through producing and presenting reports and tactics, and the decision-makers *impacting* the criminal environment through Intel-informed actions known to be effective and appropriately tailored to the context. Using Intel well requires organisational structures that bring decision-makers (not necessarily only Police, but also other agencies) together to consider and use Intel products to formulate and action crime reduction strategies.

In all of the areas studied, the Intel function developed and increased in use throughout the research period. In Manurewa and Sydenham, this meant restructuring to enhance Intel

resourcing at area rather than district level. The Lower Hutt Intel function (named Tactics) had been well-developed since 2000 and was regarded as the hub of the area's burglary reduction strategies. The roles of the Intel units are best outlined in terms of the elements of good practice which have been drawn from the case studies and from the international literature and are detailed below.

8.6.1 Good practice—Intelligence structure

As a structure, Intel refers to the Intel unit, its staff, resources, methods, skills, and organisational structure. The following ideas for good practice in Intel structure were drawn from the case studies and from the international literature.

Some practices for creating a good Intel structure include:

- focusing and resourcing Intel at Area level
- staffing Intel units with people skilled in strategic analysis and an ability and willingness to try new strategies and tools
- staffing Intel units with sufficient data-entry staff
- facilitating training opportunities, including participating in national training
- providing a strong national directive for Intel resourcing and standards
- having district Intel support areas in training, in joint projects, and by lending staff
- having district Intel coordinate information sharing by area Intel units through:
 - holding regular meetings
 - monitoring area progress against district targets
 - completing special projects.

Cope (2004) suggests that training and development for both Intel analysts and Police is crucial to developing productive working relationships.

Ratcliffe (2002) raised a number of concerns about the information technology system requirements and Intel processes associated with implementing 'Intel-led' policing. A number of the evaluations studied have specifically mentioned the demands that particular strategies have made on the IT systems and on the quality of data available and the enormous investment of resources required to gather the Intel required, e.g. to identify repeat victims.

8.6.2 Good practice—Intelligence process

As a process, Intel refers to the continuous cycle of data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback. The following ideas for good practice in Intel as a process were drawn from the case studies and from the international literature.

Some processes Intel units have put in place include:

- disseminating information and daily taskings at shift fall-in
- providing DP sheet for each officer on every shift and collect sheets with recorded activity at the end of shift
- presenting the strategy for the coming week to the weekly crime meeting
- informing every section of their tasks in meeting the week's focus at the crime meeting, or in writing for late and night shifts
- convening a daily briefing with CIB, specialised squads and strategic units
- establishing weekly briefings for voluntary community patrols
- instituting training across the whole force in quality notings, offence reports and what to report, and deadlines for entering information into NIA
- keeping information up to date by prompt data entry
- managing the entry of area data to the national database (LES/NIA) and discourage reliance on separate databases for separate sections
- auditing files and recorded incidents to ensure information on recorded crime is accurate
- passing on analysis from files and notings to specialised squad, CIB or general duties units
- sending group emails to Area staff, including weekly briefing reports
- maintaining a photo-board including targeted offenders
- providing media releases
- avoiding inundating frontline staff with information by prioritising
- passing information to partner agencies, e.g. NS
- creating a sense of pride in the area in being 'Intel-driven'.

8.6.3 Good practice—Intelligence as product

As a product, Intel refers both to the reports produced and to the presentation of information to decision-makers who will act on the basis of the Intel they receive. The following ideas for good practice for Intel as a product were drawn from the case studies and from the international literature.

Good examples of Intel as a product include:

- full and complete database of burglaries for the area in NIA, entering full offence reports, notings of targeted persons and suspicious activity—this enables later retrieval, and lets links be made between offence reports and suspicious activity
- information reported to Comms in previous 24 hours provided to daily tasking meetings
- MAP analysis on MO, times, property, locations, repeat victims
- profiles of targeted recidivist offenders circulated or displayed

- information for bail checks—e.g. a Bail Matrix analysing the top offenders on bail to direct bail checks for the following week; include photo, name, address, bail conditions, next court date, and details of family living arrangements
- notings from all sections entered into NIA—names, addresses, places and times seen, associates, vehicles, etc.
- area and district information linked
- DP sheet—analysing crime risk of sub-areas within the Police Area and producing sub-area crime profiles
- analysis of crime trends for weekly meetings—compare week with previous week and similar weeks in previous years
- a weekly problem profile—‘hot’ locations, property, victims and offenders
- warrants for arrest, offenders on bail, and prison releasees coordinated and prioritised
- information provided to local media
- repeat victims identified and referred to VS
- MAPs to identify ‘hot’ locations and corridors
- bail checks, resolutions, search warrants, and arrests recorded and monitored
- data on youth offenders entered into NIA
- regular reports for Police management on key indicators such as recorded incidents and resolutions.

9 Barriers to good practice for reducing burglary

In all Police Areas, consistent themes emerged in relation to barriers to instituting effective burglary reduction strategies. These can be grouped into:

- relationships with justice sector agencies
- data and information technology issues
- Police numbers
- the role of the Police Communications Centres.

9.1 Relationships with other justice sector agencies

In some areas practices of other justice sector agencies were seen to be a barrier to successful implementation of police strategies. In particular there was a perception that the sentences handed down to convicted burglary offenders did not reflect the seriousness with which the public and government viewed the offence of burglary. Sentencing for burglary was seen as working against Police objectives in bringing offenders before the Courts. Police also believed that the frequently profound impact of burglary on victims was not being reflected in sentences. They perceived that the Courts treated burglary as a property offence rather than as crime against the person.

Some Police interviewed stated that Courts could also frustrate what Police were trying to achieve when seeking bail conditions or prosecuting offenders for breach of bail.

In the area of youth offending, there was thought to be insufficient resourcing for proper monitoring of Family Group Conference plans and a general lack of programmes for youth offenders.

Police perceived there was also a general reluctance to share information between justice sector agencies because of privacy issues.

9.2 Data and information technology issues

In all Police Areas there could be huge backlogs of data entry. The initiatives being implemented to a large extent relied on the prompt retrieval of electronic information and delays inhibited flows of information and reduced the effectiveness of interventions. In some cases, delays in obtaining information encouraged units to set up their own databases, which was counter to the information-sharing goal of the new NIA. In some areas there was a lack

of adequate information technology hardware; for example, the need to share computers between staff did away with the advantages of access to data. Some complained that NIA was slow and cumbersome.

9.3 Police numbers

In some Areas Police stated that they were barely coping with frontline work and in all areas Police believed there was insufficient resourcing to carry out the proactive work necessary to reduce burglary. New demands, such as a new focus on reducing theft of cars, were being added to existing priorities. Proactive work (e.g. DP, bail checks) was constantly put aside because of the need to direct staff to emergency response, serious crime investigation (drug enquiries, murder, aggravated robbery, family violence), and district and national demands for Police, including court work, leave, training, and secondments. Constantly running with staff numbers below the official allocation threatened the sustainability of burglary reduction efforts, particularly when there were also gaps in leadership. Staff in all areas questioned the priority given to road traffic policing, particularly the number of traffic hours required of general duties staff.

9.4 Communications centres

In all areas, staff referred to delays between the first call reporting a burglary in progress and the dispatch of units in the area as a barrier to apprehending burglars and to providing quality service to victims. A lack of knowledge of local areas and the inexperience of some call-takers also resulted at times in poor information being transmitted to Police on the ground.

10 What we have learnt

10.1 Strategies informed by international research

In general, the research team was impressed by the extent to which the burglary reduction strategies being applied in Police Areas were informed by international research. The practices and approaches we observed were in line with models for coordinated Intel-led strategy derived from American, British and Australian business development models applied to policing.

The four case studies show evidence of local strategies being developed over the period of the research in response to national strategic direction and district accountability requirements to address local crime problems. Lower Hutt began with 'Operation Madrid' in 2000, the Crime Focus in 2003, and the introduction of the 'Crime and Crash Reduction Intel Model' in 2004. Manurewa developed its area strategy following restructuring in 2004. In Rotorua, a Burglary Reduction Strategy was developed in 2002, but was only fully implemented by mid-2004. Key elements of the local strategies were:

- whole-of-policing approaches to burglary reduction
- strengthening the Intel function
- focusing on 'hot' offenders, victims, locations and property
- moving toward more proactive and problem-solving approaches
- using accountability processes to monitor compliance with proactive work.

The New Zealand strategies at both a national and local level can be seen to contain a number of elements derived from policing models that have been found to be successful elsewhere. For example, COMSTAT, developed in the New York Police Department in the 1990s, required district commanders to closely monitor crime in their areas, identify crime patterns, devise and implement solutions and make sure those solutions worked. They were held accountable at meetings with police executives where they were expected to present their strategies and results (Skogan and Frydl 2004). A modified COMPSTAT process, the OCR Panels, introduced in NSW in 1998, was strongly suggested to have been effective in reducing the incidence of break and enter (Chilvers and Weatherburn 2001). The UK National Intel Model is also a comprehensive 'business process' to handle information and deploy resources (John and Maguire 2004).

10.2 Strategic direction as important as specific interventions

It was clear to the research team that the development of comprehensive, multicomponent local strategies for burglary reduction was as important for effectiveness as the

implementation of specific interventions. Much of the international research evidence for effectiveness of burglary reduction interventions relates to the implementation of comprehensive multicomponent strategies (see Jordan 1998).

The case studies showed that important elements of local strategic direction were:

- the central role of the Intel function in providing information, providing direction and coordinating the burglary reduction effort
- the establishment of a management position, e.g. the Tactical Coordinator in Rotorua and the Crime Strategy Manager in Lower Hutt, as the acknowledged leader of the area's crime reduction work, to:
 - coordinate implementation of the local strategy
 - manage the deployment of staff
 - direct staff toward proactive work
- the weekly whole-of-area meeting leading to ownership of the strategy by every staff member of the area
- a directed daily briefing for each section
- lifting performance in routine procedures such as taking offence reports and processing files
- increasing training and supervision on key requirements
- the ability to gather information to monitor progress and compliance
- the regular communication of progress by means of weekly crime meetings
- the regular appraisal of unit and individual performance on specific tasks.

Effective leadership was an important factor in ensuring commitment to strategic direction. This could be seen in the Rotorua Police Area, which was hindered during 2003 by several senior positions being unfilled and a lack of focus. The recorded burglary rate rose sharply until the appointment of a new Area Commander late in 2003. By contrast, Lower Hutt is the only area which has had a consistent Area Commander, who has been a promoter and leader of burglary reduction strategies throughout the period. Aspects of leadership that were respected were:

- engendering the sense of working as a team with a common focus
- expecting a high level of performance from all team members
- having no division between management and other staff
- communicating clearly.

These features of leadership were seen to be important for other senior management positions within an area. Skilled leadership was important in overcoming pockets of resistance to the introduction of new strategies and practices.

10.3 Geographical context influences strategic approaches

Throughout the research period we observed a tension in strategic development between areas or districts as units of focus. Over time, there was an overall trend toward formerly district-wide interventions becoming localised at area level. Examples were:

- dividing the Bay of Plenty LET into Area teams under the control of Area Commanders
- refocusing Intel, emergency response and Law Enforcement Teams at Area level in Counties-Manukau in 2003, and the associated establishment of a 'strategic tasking meeting' involving the District Commander, four Area Commanders and the Crime Manager
- the enhancement of Intel resources at area level in Canterbury District in 2003.

On the other hand, the Canterbury District continued to deploy a number of Police resources on a district basis to overcome issues that resulted from policing within a large metropolitan mass with no clear natural boundaries. A district-wide approach was identified as important for offender-focused interventions to address the high mobility of burglary offenders between the five Christchurch City Police Areas. These included the District Break Squad, the Youth Crime Unit, and the First Fifteen initiative, which targeted recidivist burglars.

The trend observed over the three-year research period suggests that strategic approaches and new resourcing would most effectively be focused at Police Area level, unless, as in the Canterbury District, unique contextual factors indicate otherwise.

10.4 Strategies were subject to varying intensity and sustainability

The researchers heard from all areas of the difficulties in sustaining burglary reduction efforts which were added to existing local policing requirements without additional resourcing. The proactive work required for burglary reduction could frequently not be sustained in the face of the many demands on policing resources already mentioned. Staff members in burglary-focused positions were frequently called upon to relieve or assist in other sections. New positions and units dedicated to burglary reduction reduced the numbers in emergency response or general duties units who responded to day-to-day work.

In Manurewa in 2002, initiatives which were seen to be effective were being disbanded due to staffing demands. In Sydenham in 2003, the Break Squad was disbanded following pressures arising from the investigation of local homicides. In Lower Hutt, staffing pressures resulting in reduced intensity of the burglary reduction effort were thought to have caused the sharp increase in recorded burglary in 2003.

The effect of varying intensity of the application of the burglary effort can be seen in the time-series analysis of recorded residential burglary rates for each area. The periods of reduced intensity of the overall effort are periods of increased recorded residential burglary rates and periods of greater intensity are periods of reduced recorded residential burglary rates.

Intensity is reflected not only by the number of interventions, but by the overall co-ordination and leadership of the burglary reduction effort. This corresponds with the finding of the extensive evaluations of the UK RBI, which found that the success of the schemes in reducing burglary could be directly and positively related to overall project intensity and particularly the intensity of actual implementation of measures on the ground (Bowers, Johnson and Hirschfield 2004).

10.5 Moving toward whole-of-policing, problem-solving approaches

In addressing the problem of residential burglary, district and area commanders and their staff had to decide what to do in the knowledge that Police resourcing was limited and expected to be applied in ways that would give demonstrable results. A trend observed in the configuration and reconfiguration of local strategies over the research period was a search for reorganisation which would produce a sustained reduction in priority crimes without increasing resourcing.

The case studies of two areas showed some evidence of displacement from residential burglary to other property offences, such as non-residential burglary and theft from cars during the research period. This suggests that a concentrated effort on one priority crime can result in resources being drawn away from other crime areas.

Some saw sustained crime reduction as achievable through implementing problem-solving and whole-of-policing approaches, rather than dedicating resources to burglary reduction. Having the flexibility to try new approaches in response to new problems also appeared to lift staff morale and kept Police practice unpredictable to offenders.

Developing examples of problem-solving whole-of-policing approaches were the Rotorua Burglary Reduction Strategy, which was fully implemented in mid-2004, and the Lower Hutt Crime and Crash Reduction Intel Model (Hutt CRIM) introduced in 2004. The Rotorua strategy incorporated offender-, victim-, location- and property-focused approaches with improvements to systems and processes for dealing with burglary and strengthened community partnerships. For example, Rotorua Police were a party to the Rotorua District Council Crime Prevention and Action Plan in 2004 and had an ongoing partnership with the Rotorua Police Maori Advisory Group. Hutt CRIM aimed to use district and area Intel to forecast policing priorities through quarterly strategic crime control meetings between Police and community stakeholders. Activities addressing priority areas were assigned to individuals or units within the area, allocated at daily tasking meetings and reviewed in terms of progress made. All sections within the area took responsibility for and gave priority to specific tasks for which they became accountable. By the conclusion of the research period these practices and the involvement of community partners in Hutt CRIM were still in their early stages.

10.6 Variety of contributors to recorded burglary rates

There are many possible contributors to the trends in the incidence of burglary and it has not been possible in this research to directly attribute changes in burglary rates to Police practices.

It is known that in New Zealand short-term fluctuations in recorded crime rates are associated with economic cycles. When business confidence is high dishonesty offences tend to decrease, and when business confidence is low dishonesty offences tend to increase. Increases in dishonesty offences are also associated with growth in female employment, and a diminishing youth population has a minor impact on reducing dishonesty offences. Trends in unemployment have not been found to be associated with trends in recorded crime (Triggs 1997), although there is a weak relationship between unemployment and juvenile property offending (Fergusson et al. 1997—cited in Triggs 1997). Fluctuations in the amount of recorded crime are also affected by changes in public willingness to report crime and to changes in Police recording practices.

All of these factors, as well as new and improved police strategies, are likely to have contributed to the 15% decline in rates of recorded residential burglary across New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Over the same period rates of residential burglary fell by a substantially larger percentage in three of the areas studied (by 21% in Sydenham, by 28% in Lower Hutt and by 26% in Manurewa) and increased in one of the areas (by 14% in Rotorua) (New Zealand Police 2005). The household surveys carried out for this research did not find any statistically significant differences in the incidence of burglaries reported by participants in any of the areas between 2001 and 2003, reflecting the wide margins of error attached to the survey's results.

11 The way forward

11.1 Comprehensive, multicomponent problem-solving approaches

Clearly no single Police intervention or practice will reduce burglary. As a complex problem with complex causes, burglary requires a problem-solving approach. This involves:

- gathering information and analysing the issues underlying the problem
- learning about the nature of events, offenders and victims
- considering all of the factors that have brought them together.

This allows the development and implementation of a range of responses specifically tailored to address the problem with sensitivity to local contexts. These responses go beyond traditional policing approaches (Skogan and Frydl 2003).

All of the Police Areas studied for this research were at varying stages in the development of such approaches. It is clear that any additional resourcing applied to burglary reduction should be applied flexibly to the highest-risk areas to be used at the discretion of District and Area Commanders. They are best able to determine the most effective use of area resources for whole-of-policing problem-solving strategies in their areas. As Sherman has stated: 'Additional police may prevent crime depending on how well they are focused on specific objectives, task, places, time and people...The connection of policing to risk factors is the most powerful conclusion from three decades of research' (Sherman et al. 1997, 8-1).

11.2 Partnerships

It is also evident that Police cannot shoulder the sole responsibility of reducing burglary or other crime. The longer-term burglary prevention measures needed in communities at risk rely on partnerships with other local agencies and community organisations. These include the traditional partnerships with Neighbourhood Support, Victim Support and local authorities, along with more creative partnerships with, for example, Housing New Zealand, and the building, retail, and security industries, which are a natural offshoot of the creative problem-solving approaches. A note of caution is necessary, however: working in partnerships is complex and demanding, requiring both commitment and capacity to make them work, a lesson from the Local Crime and Disorder Partnerships established as part of the Reducing Burglary Initiatives in the UK (Kodz and Pease 2003). It may not be a Police responsibility to initiate and sustain such partnerships.

An important lesson from this research is the need for the agencies of the justice sector to operate in a coordinated and integrated manner in addressing the priorities of the Crime Reduction Strategy. At times Police appear to be hampered by a lack of cohesion among

justice sector agencies in addressing the goals of crime reduction. In part this could be addressed through Police initiating meetings with local agencies such as the Probation Service, Judges and Prisons to explain the Police role in addressing crime reduction goals and the measures being put in place to meet them. There is also a need to ensure that policy and legislation at a national level are in accord with the agreed sector crime reduction goals.

11.3 Integrate work with youth offenders into crime reduction strategies

There is evidence that burglary is in substantial part a youth crime problem. In the areas studied the youth policing sections appeared somewhat detached from the burglary reduction effort and whole-of-policing approaches, although some areas were taking steps to address this. It is important to find ways of integrating the work of this staff into strategic approaches to burglary reduction. A first key step is to ensure youth offending data is entered into integrated information systems for easy accessibility by all staff. At the same time it is also important to retain and affirm the specific good practice and knowledge that youth policing sections have built up in relation to policing youth offending.

11.4 Enhance victim-focused approaches

While the offender-, location- and property-focused approaches to burglary reduction are substantially developed in the four areas studied, this research suggests that possible benefits could be gained from giving more emphasis to victim-focused approaches to burglary reduction. The household surveys delivered a powerful message that burglary can be reduced by householders adopting simple security measures, such as the use of lighting, locking up and telling neighbours when they will be away. Moreover, the survey confirmed that a substantial proportion of burglary incidents are repeat victimisations of a small number of victims. Endorsing the role of the attending officer in offering security advice, improving the target hardening programme to focus on the identified groups at risk of repeat victimisation, and using publicity and public education creatively are all ways of strengthening victim-focused approaches.

11.5 Conclusion

This research has taken a longer-term view of Police efforts in local areas to organise and re-organise to address the problem of residential burglary. The mechanisms by which the interventions were expected to work have largely operated as expected. The research has not been able to draw a direct link between Police efforts and the observed declining recorded residential burglary rates in three of the areas studied and in New Zealand generally over the research period. Nevertheless, it has been shown that the strategies employed by local Police are very much in accord with internationally accepted effective practice. The detailed study of four Police Areas has resulted in a wealth of information on practices which have worked when adapted to the contexts of New Zealand communities. The readiness of New Zealand Police to search for and try new and innovative approaches is very much at the heart of problem-oriented policing.

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